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I. INTRODUCTION
In late February 2009, Rita Cote, a mother of four, called police in
[the] Central Florida town [of Tavares] because her sister was allegedly
attacked by her boyfriend. But when police showed up, rather than focus
on the actual crime, they turned on Cote, who doesn’t speak English.
Tavares is located in Lake County. And the Lake County sheriff . . .

* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Many thanks to Maya Manian, Kate Desormeau, and
Kristen Holmquist for their suggestions on an early draft of this article. Danielle Johnston, Laurie
Furstenfeld, and Emily Gibbs provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Amy Wright,
the online research services librarian at the University of San Francisco School of Law.
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had campaigned on the promise that he would deport illegal immigrants.
The police demanded to see Cote’s papers, and when she only offered
a bank identification card, they arrested her.
The man who had allegedly left marks and bruises on her sister was
never even picked up.
As bad as that might be, it gets worse. She was held for eight days
without being able to contact family. She was transferred to immigration
authorities in Broward County, in South Florida, hours away from her
family, before finally being released. By the way, her children and husband
are all American citizens. . . . In fact, her husband is an Iraq War veteran.1
Cote was fortunate to be released from immigration custody. Danny Sigui
was not so lucky:
In Providence, Rhode Island, Guatemalan immigrant Danny Sigui helped
convict a murderer by providing critical testimony against the accused.
During preparation of the case, the state attorney general’s office learned
that Sigui was an undocumented immigrant, and reported him to the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). . . . When asked whether he
would have come forward again, knowing that doing so would lead to his
deportation, Sigui replied: “If I had known they would take my liberty,
that they would take my children away from me, that they would put me
[in immigration detention], I would not do this.” 2
Sigui was deported following the trial,3 in spite of an appeal from friends and the
state attorney general office to allow him to stay.4
As private persons attempting to assist local law enforcement officials
apprehend criminals, Cote and Sigui could have been spared the immigration
enforcement nightmare had there been sanctuary policies in their communities.5
Policies that instruct officers to refrain from asking crime victims or witnesses

1. Ralph De La Cruz, ‘The Police Took Mommy’: How Reporting a Crime Nearly Resulted in
Deportation for Florida Woman, FLA. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://fcir.org/2011/01/31/the-police-took-mommy-how-reporting-a-crime-nearly-resulted-indeportation-for-florida-woman.
2. LYNN TRAMONTE, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF “SANCTUARY
CITIES” 3 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Community
PolicingPaper3-09.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Tatiana Pina, Guatemalan Immigrant to Be Deported, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1.
5. Admittedly, even in San Francisco, California, where there is a sanctuary policy, its
application has not always been consistent. In one high profile incident that occurred in 2004, a
stabbing victim reached out to San Francisco police officers for help. Philip Hwang, Call the Cops, Get
Deported, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 8–14, 2006, at 7. She was shocked when police turned her over
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, while her assailant went unpunished. Id. The
Office of Citizen Complaints launched an investigation, concluded that the police had violated the
Sanctuary Ordinance, and forwarded the case to the Police Department for discipline. Id. The primary
officer simply was given retraining. Id.; see also infra note 328.
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about their immigration status are in place in more than seventy cities and states,6
such as San Francisco and New York, and are also followed by many law
enforcement agencies, such as the New Haven and Los Angeles police
departments.7 Thousands of other police agencies are reluctant to be viewed as
partners in federal immigration enforcement.8 The motivation behind these laws
and policies is simple: to encourage the entire community—including immigrant
members—to trust and cooperate with the police to promote public safety for
everyone.9 If this message is delivered successfully, I also believe that its tone is an
important, positive step in encouraging the civic integration of immigrant
communities that stands in sharp contrast to the xenophobic undercurrent of
measures such as Arizona’s S.B. 107010 and the billions of dollars spent annually in
border and interior enforcement of federal immigration laws.11
Sanctuary ordinances or policies that constrain local authorities from
assisting in federal immigration enforcement do not receive the same political and
media attention as anti-immigrant laws enacted by states and local governments.
In the political struggle over the rights of undocumented immigrants in the United
States, the greater media and political focus on anti-immigrant measures, such as
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and similar policies in cities like Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and
Farmers Branch, Texas, is understandable.12 The widely publicized proposal and
6. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4; Benjamin Wachs, Sanctuary City: Now Endorsed by 17,945 Law
Enforcement Agencies Nationwide, S.F. WEEKLY, Aug. 26, 2008, http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch
/2008/08/sanctuary_city_now_endorsed_by.php. An anti-immigrant organization, Ohio Jobs and
Justice PAC, maintains a constantly updated website that lists dozens of cities and localities that it
considers sanctuary cities. Steve Salvi, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA, http://ojjpac.org/
sanctuary.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
7. See infra notes 36–43, 80–82 and accompanying text.
8. Pamela Constable, Many Officials Reluctant to Help Arrest Immigrants, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
2008, at B1.
9. In the words of Police Chief Charlie Dean of Prince William County, Virginia, “I have a
responsibility to provide service to the entire community—no matter how they got here. It is in the
best interest of our community to trust the police.” DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., POLICE EXEC.
RESEARCH FORUM, POLICE AND IMMIGRATION: HOW CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR
COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE CHALLENGES 15–16 (2010), available at http://policeforum.org/
library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf.
10. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1051 (2010) (commonly known as S.B. 1070).
11. BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS 178–82 (2006); BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL
BORDERS 29–63 (2010).
12. Arizona’s S.B. 1070 included provisions that required police officers to check the
immigration status of everyone arrested in the state, made it a state crime to not have lawful status or
to work in the state without authorization, and authorized state officers to enforce the civil provisions
of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act. See generally United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011). In 2006, the northeastern Pennsylvania city of Hazleton passed an ordinance that
sought to deny business permits to companies that employ undocumented immigrants, fine landlords
who rent to them, and require legal tenants to register and pay for a rental permit. Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176–80 (3d Cir. 2010). The Farmers Branch ordinance similarly would
require all adults in the city who live in rental housing to register with the city and provide citizenship
and immigration information in order to obtain a so-called “residential occupancy license.” Villas at
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enactment of those laws are countered by vociferous opposition from immigrants
and their allies. The protests generally are followed by high-profile lawsuits that
challenge the propriety and constitutionality of the laws. Supporters of the
subfederal anti-immigrant statutes argue that they must act because federal
policymakers and enforcement officials have failed at their jobs. Detractors raise
serious legal questions about the ability of state and local officials to act in a field
that generally has been viewed as an exclusive federal domain.
With much less fanfare, the legality of sanctuary policies also has been
challenged. For example, in City of New York v. United States,13 New York City
unsuccessfully argued that a federal statute that appeared to interfere with the
city’s sanctuary policy violated the Tenth Amendment. The federal Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress was not forcing the city to
enforce immigration laws, but simply barred any local restrictions that might
interfere with voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with federal
immigration agents.14 But in Sturgeon v. Bratton,15 a California court of appeal found
no conflict between the same federal statute and the sanctuary policy of the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and dismissed a challenge to the sanctuary
policy by a disgruntled taxpayer.16 Those cases are discussed more fully in Part III.
Understanding why sanctuary policies are constitutional is important to the
raging debate over immigration. Seemingly on a daily basis, anti-immigrant
measures are proposed or enacted by state and local governments.17 In contrast,
some jurisdictions that regard gaining the trust of immigrant communities as a
necessity for public safety or that view themselves as immigrant friendly choose an
approach that de-emphasizes the immigration status of those encountered in the
course of police work. As Sturgeon v. Bratton illustrates, anti-immigrant groups stand
ready to challenge those policies.18 Additionally, the proliferation of litigation
challenging the constitutionality of anti-immigrant ordinances raises the question
of whether one set of subfederal immigration-related approaches (sanctuary
policies) can be constitutional, while a different set (anti-immigrant legislation) is
not. To put it bluntly, can those in the immigrant rights community that promote

Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839 (N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, No.
10–10751, 2012 WL 952252 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012).
13. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
14. See infra notes 89–111 and accompanying text.
15. 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009).
16. See infra notes 112–44 and accompanying text.
17. In the first quarter of 2010 alone, state legislators in forty-five states introduced 1,180 bills
and resolutions relating to immigration; by the end of March, thirty-four state legislatures had passed
seventy-one laws and adopted eighty-seven such resolutions. Huma Khan, Immigration Debate: Number
of City, State Bills Relating to Immigration Increase, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/immigration-debate-number-city-state-bills-relating-immigration/story?id=11220316.
18. See also infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text discussing how San Francisco Mayor
Newsom worried publicly about the constitutionality of the city’s sanctuary ordinance—a concern
that was partly fueled by advice he received from the city attorney’s office.
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sanctuary ordinances and attack anti-immigrant proposals have it both ways
constitutionally?
In this Article I review the case law that specifically has involved the
constitutionality of sanctuary polices and the relevant principles of preemption
and states’ rights. That process necessarily forces some comparison with the legal
challenges over local and state anti-immigrant laws. In my view, while the
principles of federalism represented in the Supreme Court’s approach to the
Tenth Amendment and preemption drive a stake in the heart of subfederal antiimmigrant laws, those same principles guide us to the conclusion that sanctuary
policies are on safe footing. That conclusion is consistent with notions of giving
voice to the disenfranchised and those who are potentially persecuted by a
majority voicing a popular view; we must protect the voiceless from being
overwhelmed and stand guard against a majoritarian intolerance of minority
groups. So in the immigration field, the concept of preemption is an appropriate
check on overzealous subfederal enforcement efforts that directly affect
immigration regulation, while the Tenth Amendment is a check on federal
intrusion on a local jurisdiction’s attempt to be more protective of individual
rights when the locality has a legitimate nonimmigration-related purpose, such as
public safety.
The discussion on the legality of sanctuary policies will reveal that the
reserved police powers and local economic decisions under principles of
federalism play a major part in the analysis. For that reason, a deeper
understanding of the rationale for sanctuary policies is crucial. We will find that in
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies, local policy makers and law enforcement
officials have made thoughtful and deliberate public safety decisions, taking great
pains to do the right thing for the entire community. Those decisions are critical
to principles of inclusion in our ever-growing diverse communities. For that
reason, the sanctuary framework is good public policy—especially in contrast to
the anti-immigrant examples of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 or Hazleton, Pennsylvania.
This Article attempts to provide an understanding of the rationale behind
sanctuary policies as a necessary step in addressing constitutional and policy
concerns. In Part II, I examine the background and descriptions of some of the
sanctuary ordinances and policies that can be found across the country. Part III
presents an analysis of the constitutionality of sanctuary policies primarily focusing
on Tenth Amendment and preemption analysis. In Part IV, I present the record
on why sanctuary policies are being advanced as an important ingredient to good
policing in communities with immigrant neighborhoods. Part V extends this
discussion to why sanctuary policies are good public policy, especially as an
instrument to encourage civic integration. In my closing, I also refer to programs,
such as state and local partnership agreements with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) known as 287(g) agreements, the Secure Communities
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program, and the National Crime Information Center database, that threaten to
destroy public policy gains offered by sanctuary policies.
II. BACKGROUND
Like many cities and jurisdictions across the country in the 1980s, San
Francisco declared itself a “city of refuge” or “sanctuary” city in response to the
deportation of Central American refugees who had fled to the United States
searching for protection from the civil conflicts that were raging in their
countries.19 San Francisco’s 1985 resolution, passed by the city and county’s Board
of Supervisors and signed by the mayor, was considered nonbinding, although its
language stated that “federal employees, not City employees, should be considered
responsible for implementation of immigration and refugee policy” and that city
departments should not act in a manner toward Salvadoran and Guatemalan
refugees that would “cause their deportation.”20 However, after two 1989
incidents involving San Francisco police officers who cooperated with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Salvadoran consul, the
Board of Supervisors adopted an ordinance that specifically prohibited officials
from asking about or disseminating an individual’s immigration status “unless
required by federal or state law.”21 Now, presumably, the ordinance had teeth; San
Francisco officials—including law enforcement officers—were not to inquire
about individuals’ immigration status.
The exception “unless specifically required” by state or federal law became
relevant a few years later and is relevant today under preemption and Tenth
Amendment scrutiny.22 In 1993, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to
amend the ordinance, permitting an exception for individuals arrested and booked
on felonies. In 1990, Congress passed a law that required states receiving federal
block grants for crime and drug control, such as California, to provide certified
copies of state criminal conviction records to federal immigration authorities
within thirty days of conviction.23 So, in 1992, the California Office of Criminal
Justice Planning (OCJP), which was responsible for administering the federal
block grant, played it safe and decided to require grant recipients, such as San
Francisco, to report individuals to the INS upon arrest—even prior to

19. Ignatius Bau, City of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government
Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 50–53 (1994).
20. S.F. Bd. of Supervisors Res. 1087-85 (1985).
21. Bau, supra note 19, at 53–54; see also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12.H.2 (1989).
22. Language in sanctuary policies that provide exceptions when federal authorities ask for
immigration information that local authorities have helps to avoid preemption. See infra notes 180–83
and accompanying text.
23. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 507, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). The next
year, Congress amended the law to require simple notice of conviction in lieu of certified records,
unless INS requested the certified records. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(6), 105 Stat. 1751 (1991).
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conviction.24 With some dissent,25 San Francisco complied by amending the
sanctuary ordinance and incorporating the exception for individuals arrested.26
Thus, the state and San Francisco went beyond the federal requirement of
reporting immigrants with convictions, and the new ordinance language required
reporting of individuals simply upon arrest. However, outside of those
circumstances, the ordinance required officers to refrain from asking individuals
about immigration status. Ironically, the federal requirement that recipients of the
block grants provide notice of criminal convictions subsequently was eliminated,27
but San Francisco has never repealed its exception.
The history of San Francisco’s ordinance suggests that the ordinance falls
into a genre of policies that can be classified as expressions of “solidarity” with the
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s when thousands of refugees from El Salvador
and Guatemala fled to the United States seeking refuge from civil strife.28 Most of
the asylum seekers were denied relief under narrow interpretations of the asylum
laws, so churches and synagogues protested the decisions by offering their places
of worship to house and protect the migrants.29 Thus, cities like San Francisco
stepped into the fray with their own sympathetic policies to make a statement in
opposition to the limited grant of asylum by U.S. officials to the migrants.30
Though it may be tempting to regard the current multitude of sanctuary
policies as statements in opposition to federal immigration enforcement decisions,
the public justification offered for the vast majority of such policies generally is
presented in terms of public safety. The idea is that by seeking to create good
relations and trust with immigrant communities, law enforcement is more
effective for the entire community. In fact some immigrant rights advocates and
law enforcement officials rail against the “sanctuary” terminology, arguing that the
misnomer distracts the public from the real purpose of the policies to provide safe
communities for all residents.31 They prefer “community policing,”
“confidentiality,” or “preventive policing” labels.32 The LAPD policy, issued in
24. See, e.g., Letter from Cal. Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1 (Sept. 29, 1993).
25. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted six to four to amend the ordinance to
comply with OCJP’s directive, in order to avoid the loss of federal funding.
26. Bau, supra note 19, at 68–70.
27. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-162, § 1111, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005).
28. Bau, supra note 19, at 53–54.
29. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4.
30. Bau, supra note 19, at 50–53.
31. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 5.
32. See Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Fed. Immigration
Laws: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong.
84 (2009) (testimony of George Gascón, Chief, Mesa Police Dep’t, Mesa, Ariz.); DAVID A. HARRIS,
GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 14–25 (2005); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM,
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 2–3 (2007); TRAMONTE, supra
note 2, at 1. A Congressional Research Service report defines a “sanctuary city” this way:
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1979, is cited as an early example of a community policy approach implemented
prior to the influx of Central American refugees and the Sanctuary Movement.33
The evolution of some relatively recent sanctuary policies makes clear that
public safety is their main goal.34 In New Haven, Connecticut, in 2005, the police
chief, government officials, and community leaders adopted two initiatives
“designed to make New Haven more welcoming and safer for immigrants, and to
help police officers during interactions with immigrants.”35 The police issued a
general order outlining procedures for police to follow during encounters with
immigrants, and the city began issuing identification cards to all city residents
regardless of immigration status.36 New Haven’s population was close to a quarter
Latino by 2007, and 10,000 to 15,000 residents were undocumented.37 According
to New Haven police, immigrants are often the victims, rather than perpetrators,
of crime. They are targets of street robberies and home invasions. The crimes
committed by undocumented immigrants include disorderly conduct, public
intoxication, and motor vehicle violations. Domestic violence was identified as an
“ongoing problem” in immigrant communities.38 Under the police department’s
general order, no distinction is made between documented and undocumented
immigrants because they are all “part of our community.”39 In other words, the
department “would rather solve a homicide than worry about” the immigration

Most cities that are considered sanctuary cities have adopted a “don’t ask-don’t tell” policy
where they don’t require their employees, including law enforcement officers, to report to
federal officials aliens who may be illegally present in the country.
Localities, and in some cases individual police departments, in such areas that are
considered “sanctuary cities,” have utilized various mechanisms to ensure that
unauthorized aliens who may be present in their jurisdiction illegally are not turned in to
federal authorities.
LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW:
THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006).
33. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4.
34. On the other hand, the justification for the sanctuary policy in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
first enacted in 1985 and renewed in 2006 suggests that it falls in the genre of statements of solidarity
with immigrants who are victims of unjust U.S. immigration enforcement policies as laws:
RESOLVED: That the City of Cambridge reaffirm its commitment as a Sanctuary City, as
declared by City Council Order Number 4 of April 8, 1985; and be it further
RESOLVED: That the City of Cambridge endorses the platform of the National Alliance
of Latin American and Caribbean Communities’ Keep Our Families Together Campaign:

Create an opportunity to apply for legal permanent residency status.

Expedition of family visas.

Visionary program for future migration flows that respects the rights of immigrants
as workers and as human beings.

The social, political and economic integration of new immigrants into US society . . . .
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CITY COUNCIL ORDER NO. 16 (May 8, 2006), available at
http://www.rwinters.com/council/sanctuary2006.htm.
35. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
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status of a witness or victim.40 Officers are prohibited from asking crime victims,
witnesses, and anyone who approaches an officer for assistance about immigration
status.41 As a result of the policy and follow-up initiatives, cooperation with police
has “increased dramatically” and important strides have been made in getting the
community to overcome its “fear of the police.”42
The process of forging what can loosely be labeled a sanctuary policy was
quite different in Prince William County, Virginia.43 Between 2000 and 2007, the
Latino population increased from just under ten percent to almost twenty percent
of the total population.44 Violent crimes decreased, but burglary and larceny
increased.45 Until 2007, as a matter of practice, police officers did not ask
individuals about immigration status unless the person was arrested for a serious
crime.46 During the summer of 2006, a series of robberies occurred in which
Latinos—including some undocumented immigrants—were the primary victims.47
Counterintuitively, this led to an immigrant backlash and criticism of the police
chief, a forty-year veteran, for condoning a “sanctuary” policy for undocumented
immigrants.48 The Board of County Supervisors (BOCS) reacted by adopting
restrictions on social services for undocumented immigrants and ordering the
police department to enter into a partnership with ICE to assist in federal
immigration enforcement.49 These agreements are authorized under 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g) or Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 287(g). The police chief
cautioned that such a policy would discourage crime victims in immigrant
communities from coming forward, harm the department’s relationship of trust
with the community, and subject the county to allegations of racial profiling.50
Within two months, the BOCS modified the order, partly from fear that racial
profiling litigation would ensue, and only required immigration status questions

40. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. The intense debate over the issue of immigration in Prince William County is the subject
of a documentary film. 9500 LIBERTY (Interactive Democracy Alliance 2009).
44. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 14.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 14–15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 14–18. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), DHS is authorized to enter into written
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to delegate immigration enforcement
functions to select local law enforcement officers. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS: REPORT UPDATE 2 (Sept. 2010),
available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-124_Sep10.pdf. The agreements outline
terms and conditions under which participating local personnel will function as immigration officers.
Id. Pursuant to these agreements, designated officers who receive appropriate training and function
under the supervision of sworn ICE officers are permitted to perform immigration law enforcement
duties. Id.
50. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15.
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for those placed under arrest. So the policy became one of postarrest, rather than
prearrest inquiry, and every person taken into custody had to be asked about
immigration status.51
Around the same time and not far from Prince William County, Virginia,
police officials in Montgomery County, Maryland also were reassessing their
approach to encounters with immigrants. The police chief in Montgomery County
was a thirty-year law enforcement veteran in the Washington, D.C. area.52
Montgomery County experienced growth in the undocumented immigrant
population beginning in 2005 and a simultaneous trend in increased crime in
immigrant neighborhoods.53 When the police chief took the helm in 2004, he
knew that local political leaders and the community were accepting of the
undocumented population; officers generally “did not question individuals about
their immigration status.”54 However, as the media began linking crime to
undocumented immigrants, the police department’s policy was called into
question.55 In formulating an official policy, the chief wanted an approach that
would facilitate the apprehension of undocumented immigrant criminals.
However, he also wanted to enable officers to maintain positive relationships with
immigrant communities.56 After consulting with other law enforcement
departments, the community, staff, and other residents, a new policy was adopted
that requires the police only to forward to ICE the names of individuals arrested
and charged with specified serious crimes.57 To prevent racial profiling, the name
of every person arrested for those crimes is forwarded to ICE.58
Arizona’s enactment of S.B. 1070 and the notoriety of Sheriff Joe Arpaio of
Maricopa County (Phoenix metropolitan area) contribute to the state’s image as a
hotbed for subfederal immigration enforcement. S.B. 1070 included a series of
provisions that, among other things, made immigration enforcement a priority for
local police and criminalized undocumented status under state statute. Arpaio’s
zealous workplace immigration raids and traffic checkpoint sweeps made the
county the largest participant in the 287(g) program, responsible for tens of
thousands of deportations of immigrants.59 Any attempt to counter the state’s
message of hostility and unwelcome toward undocumented immigrants would
appear to be futile. However, at least two Arizona police departments have tried.
The mayor of Phoenix has tried to counteract the anti-immigrant image that
the state and county have developed. He accused Sheriff Arpaio of racial profiling
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 29.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

IMMIGRATION SANCTUARY POLICIES

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

257

and asked the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate Arpaio for allegedly
violating the constitutional rights of immigrants.60 Moreover, a local think tank
concluded that Arpaio’s tactics have actually resulted in increased crime, fewer
arrests on criminal matters, and slower 911 responses.61 In contrast to Arpaio, the
Phoenix Police Department prefers to focus on serious, violent crime when it
comes to undocumented immigrants, and prior to a 2007 killing of a police officer
by an undocumented immigrant, the department’s policy prohibited officers from
contacting federal immigration officials.62 After the shooting, the mayor proposed
a revision to the policy, and now every person arrested is asked about citizenship
status.63 If an officer suspects that the individual is undocumented and a
supervisor approves, federal ICE officials are contacted.64 However, officers are
prohibited from asking crime victims and witnesses about immigration status.65
Traffic stops and other noncriminal encounters can result in a call to ICE if the
officer suspects the person is undocumented.66 The new policy is credited with
contributing to a significant decrease in property and violent crimes.67
Another Maricopa County city, Mesa, has experienced a drop in crime
because of police department policy changes, even though critics label the changes
a “sanctuary policy.”68 The Mesa police chief and mayor were critical of Sheriff
Arpaio’s tactics that were viewed as undermining the police department’s
“relationship with the immigrant community.”69 Arpaio’s sweeps forced residents
to stay indoors and discouraged children from attending school, damaging the
department’s “efforts to build trust.”70 Police were concerned that undocumented
immigrants were preying on other Latinos who were hesitant to report crimes out
of fear of deportation.71 A new police chief, who took over the position in 2006,

60. Id. at 30. In March 2009, the DOJ launched a civil rights investigation of the sheriff’s
enforcement of federal immigration laws to determine whether deputies were engaging in “patterns or
practices of discriminatory police practices and unconstitutional searches and seizures.” Id. at 40.
Later, in September 2010, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the sheriff, his office, and the county for
refusing full cooperation with the department’s investigation. Id. Since 2007, the sheriff’s office was
responsible for nearly one-fourth of the nationwide total of deportations over a three-year period
through its 287(g) program. Id. at 29. In October 2009, ICE declined to renew the portion of the
county’s 287(g) contract that allowed deputies to arrest immigration violators during patrols; however,
the sheriff’s office retained its authority to check the immigration status of all inmates booked into
county jails. Id.
61. Id. at 31.
62. Id. at 31–32.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 39.
70. Id. at 39 (quoting a district commander from the Mesa Police Department).
71. Id. at 39–40.
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sensed suspicion and mistrust between the police and the immigrant community.72
By 2009, the chief and the mayor forged a city policy that sought to “build public
confidence in the police and trust with the communities served.”73 Under the
policy, the immigration status of persons arrested for criminal offenses is assessed.
However, officers are not to ask about the immigration status of crime victims
and witnesses, nor of anyone involved in minor misdemeanors or civil infractions,
including traffic stops.74
New York City’s policy evolved on the heels of the sanctuary movement on
behalf of Central Americans. While the public trust and confidence argument is
certainly advanced to justify the policy today, there is no doubt that New York
City mayors—including current mayor Michael Bloomberg—have a very long and
consistent proimmigrant worldview. Essentially, the city prohibits its employees
from voluntarily providing federal immigration authorities with information
concerning the immigration status of any alien. In August 1989, Edward Koch,
then New York City’s mayor, issued Executive Order No. 124. The Order
prohibited any city officer or employee from transmitting information regarding
the immigration status of any individual to federal immigration authorities unless
(i) such employee’s agency is required by law to disclose such information, (ii) an
alien explicitly authorizes a city agency to verify his or her immigration status, or
(iii) an alien is suspected by a city agency of engaging in criminal behavior.75
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Executive Order 124 provides in pertinent part:
Section 2. Confidentiality of Information Respecting Aliens.
a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting any alien to
federal immigration authorities unless
(1) Such officer’s or employee’s agency is required by law to disclose information
respecting such alien, or
(2) such agency has been authorized, in writing signed by such alien, to verify such
alien’s immigration status, or
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in criminal activity, including
an attempt to obtain public assistance benefits through the use of fraudulent documents.
b. Each agency shall designate one or more officers or employees who shall be
responsible for receiving reports from such agency’s line workers on aliens suspected of
criminal activity and for determining, on a case by case basis, what action, if any, to take on
such reports. No such determination shall be made by any line worker, nor shall any line
worker transmit information respecting any alien directly to federal immigration
authorities.
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and the Department of
Correction, shall continue to cooperate with federal authorities in investigating and
apprehending aliens suspected of criminal activity. However, such agencies shall not
transmit to federal authorities information respecting any alien who is the victim of a
crime.
Section 3. Availability of City Services to Aliens.
Any service provided by a City agency shall be made available to all aliens who are
otherwise eligible for such service unless such agency is required by law to deny eligibility
for such service to aliens. Every City agency shall encourage aliens to make use of those
services provided by such agency for which aliens are not denied eligible by laws.
City Policy Concerning Aliens, New York City Executive Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989).
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However, even if a city agency’s line workers suspect an alien of criminal activity,
the Executive Order prohibits them from transmitting information regarding such
alien directly to the federal authorities.76 Instead, it requires each agency to
designate certain officers or employees to receive reports on suspected criminal
activity from line workers and to determine on a case-by-case basis what action, if
any, to take on such reports.77 Mayor Koch’s successors, David Dinkins and
Rudolph Giuliani, reissued the Executive Order.
As noted previously, Los Angeles’ 1979 police department policy predates
the Central American-focused Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s. Special Order
40 (S.O. 40), entitled “Undocumented Aliens,” LAPD’s sanctuary policy, has been
in place since November 27, 1979.78 The order restrains police officers from
engaging in action when the only purpose is to inquire about immigration status
and arresting the person for entering the country illegally. In other words, officers
are instructed not to enforce immigration violations that they are not witnessing.79
On the other hand, when a person is arrested for more than one misdemeanor
offense or something more serious, the arresting officers do have to notify a
superior if the arrested person is determined to be undocumented. S.O. 40 was
implemented to gain the trust of the immigrant community in an effort to
encourage undocumented residents to report crimes without intimidation.80
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 724 (Ct. App. 2009). Prior to 1979,
Special Order No. 68 and its Supplemental Fact Sheet, dated November 24, 1972,
embodied LAPD policy regarding arrest for illegal entry into this country.
According to this directive, officers were not to initiate police action with the
primary objective of discovering the alien status of a person where no crime-related issues
were involved.
Whether or not a suspected undocumented alien was booked on criminal charges,
the arresting officer was to contact by phone an immigration agent who would then
interview the detainee to “determine the legality of the suspected person’s presence in the
United States.” INS could place a teletype “hold” on the suspect which became effective
after adjudication of any state criminal matter.
Where the detained person was not booked on a criminal charge and contact with
the INS revealed undocumented status, the LAPD policy required an officer to consult
divisional detectives or the watch commander for booking approval. Such approval might
be obtained where “there is a likelihood that the release of an illegal alien will create
additional police problems. (Example: Family dispute calls, possibility of an assault or
ADW occurring, etc.)” If booking approval was denied, the suspect was to be released but
the officer was to forward all available information as to the suspect’s identity to Detective
Headquarters Division (DHD).
With respect to suspected illegal aliens who were neither the object of a police
investigation nor subject to booking, an officer “need not notify INS” but instead could
merely forward information on the suspect to DHD. However, in urgent situations, such
as fires or other disasters in which a suspected illegal alien was a victim or involved, an
officer could notify DHD, which, in turn, would notify INS “who will take immediate
action to aid this Department in alleviating the problem.”
Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (Ct. App. 1987). S.O. 40 was enacted to replace
Special Order No. 68.
79. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725.
80. See Mariel Garza, Bratton: Special Order 40 Not Going Anywhere, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 14,
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Even in San Francisco today, public officials who support the city’s
sanctuary ordinance tout its public safety purpose. In explaining his support, one
member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors explained,
If you are the victim of a crime and an undocumented person was the
witness to that crime, you want that undocumented person to come
forward and report what they saw to the police. . . . They’re not going to
come forward if they’re afraid the police will report them to
immigration.81
The idea is that the policy shielding immigrants from deportation benefits other
San Franciscans as well.82 Language in San Francisco’s ordinance makes clear that
actions of local authorities are not to “be construed or implemented so as to
discourage any person, regardless of immigration status, from reporting criminal
activity to law enforcement agencies.”83
All of these examples reveal that while some local lawmakers and police
officials may be motivated by sympathy for undocumented immigrants, the stated
rationale behind the sanctuary or “don’t ask” policies with respect to witnesses,
victims, and low-level criminal arrests is public safety. The idea is that gaining the
trust of all parts of the community is important to keeping the entire community
safe.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The question of whether sanctuary policies of police departments and local
jurisdictions are constitutional has been raised in some interesting circumstances.
For example, San Francisco’s ordinance received special attention in 2008
following accusations that twenty-two-year-old Edwin Ramos committed a triple
homicide. It seems that at the age of thirteen, the Salvadoran-born Ramos had
served time in San Francisco Juvenile Hall for two felonies and was never
deported. Ramos should have been reported to immigration officials under the
policy at the time but he fell through the cracks. In what critics regard as an
overreaction, Gavin Newsom, the mayor at the time, ordered juvenile probation
authorities to treat arrested juveniles prior to conviction the same as arrested
adults under the 1993 amendment.84 Prior to Newsom’s order, only arrested (but
not yet convicted) adults were reported to immigration authorities. The new order
2008, available at http://www.insidesocal.com/friendlyfire/2008/04/bratton-special-order-40-notg.html; In the Real World: The Myths Surrounding the LAPD’s Special Order 40 May Hinder Action on
Criminal Deportations, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A16, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/
apr/09/opinion/ed-gangs9.
81. Richard Gonzales, San Francisco Youth Sanctuary Law Prompts Battle, NPR ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.wbur.org/npr/120061381/san-francisco-youthsanctuary-law-prompts-battle (quoting Supervisor David Campos).
82. Id.
83. See infra note 85 (text of the ordinance).
84. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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required arrested juveniles to be reported to ICE before conviction as well, even if
charges were later dropped. Many members of the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors bristled at the policy shift, arguing that reporting juveniles prior to any
conviction was a stunning setback to sanctuary principles because juveniles are
much different from adults under conventional norms of public policy. Within a
year, the Board, over Newsom’s veto, passed legislation that permits reporting of
juveniles to ICE only upon a finding by the juvenile court that the minor
committed a felony or if the juvenile is treated as an adult by the superior court.85
85. Maria L. La Ganga, S.F. Overrides Sanctuary Veto, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A3. San
Francisco’s ordinance currently reads as follows:
Sec. 12H.2. Use of City Funds Prohibited.
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the City and County of
San Francisco shall use any City funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of Federal
immigration law or to gather or disseminate information regarding the immigration status
of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco unless such assistance is required by
Federal or State statute, regulation or court decision. The prohibition set forth in this
Chapter shall include, but shall not be limited to:
(a) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any investigation,
detention, or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, conducted by the Federal agency
charged with enforcement of the federal immigration law and relating to alleged violations
of the civil provisions of the Federal immigration law.
....
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information regarding, the
immigration status of any individual, or conditioning the provision of services or benefits
by the City and County of San Francisco upon immigration status, except as required by
Federal or State statute or regulation, City and County public assistance criteria, or court
decision.
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire or interview form used in relation to
benefits, services or opportunities provided by the City and County of San Francisco any
question regarding immigration status other than those required by Federal or State statute,
regulation or court decision. Any such questions existing or being used by the City and
County at the time this Chapter is adopted shall be deleted within sixty days of the
adoption of this Chapter.
Sec. 12H.2-1. Chapter Provisions Inapplicable to Persons Convicted of Certain
Crimes.
Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit, or be construed as prohibiting, a Law
Enforcement Officer from identifying and reporting any adult pursuant to State or Federal
law or regulation who is in custody after being booked for the alleged commission of a
felony and is suspected of violating the civil provisions of the immigration laws. In
addition, nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit, or be construed as prohibiting, a Law
Enforcement Officer from identifying and reporting any juvenile who is suspected of
violating the civil provisions of the immigration laws if: (1) . . . (2) the San Francisco
Superior Court makes a finding of probable cause after the District Attorney directly files
felony criminal charges against the minor in adult criminal court; or (3) the San Francisco
Superior Court determines that the minor is unfit to be tried in juvenile court, the minor is
certified to adult criminal court, and the Superior Court makes a finding of probable cause
in adult criminal court.
Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude any City and County department, agency,
commission, officer or employee from (a) reporting information to the Federal agency
charged with enforcement of the Federal immigration law regarding an individual who has
been booked at any county jail facility, and who has previously been convicted of a felony
committed in violation of the laws of the State of California, which is still considered a
felony under State law; (b) cooperating with a request from the Federal agency charged
with enforcement of Federal immigration law for information regarding an individual who
has been convicted of a felony committed in violation of the laws of the State of
California, which is still considered a felony under State law; or (c) reporting information as
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Interestingly, the controversy placed a spotlight on the general
constitutionality of San Francisco’s entire sanctuary ordinance. In response to the
Board’s override of the Mayor’s veto, the San Francisco City Attorney’s office
warned that the action was “likely to result in a federal legal challenge to the [new
legislation] and possibly the entire City of Refuge Ordinance.”86 In his veto
message, the Mayor argued that the “sanctuary ordinance as originally
conceived . . . was designed to protect those residents . . . who are law abiding. It
was never meant to serve as a shield for people accused of committing serious
crimes . . . . [The] changes [adopted by the Board of Supervisors] threaten the very
existence of our sanctuary ordinance.”87 Newsom’s spokesman announced to the
press that the supervisors’ vote could invite a federal legal challenge to the city’s
entire sanctuary policy.88
Implicit in these expressions of caution that San Francisco’s entire sanctuary
ordinance may be subject to challenge is a fear that somehow the policy conflicts
with or is in violation of federal law. The caution is particularly interesting in
today’s political environment because state and local anti-immigrant laws, such as
those enacted in Arizona, Alabama, Utah, Mississippi, and the cities of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch, Texas, have been challenged on the grounds
that they conflict with federal immigration laws. The proimmigrant position in the
later situations is that only the federal government has the authority to regulate
immigrants. The intriguing question is whether that position is consistent with the
proimmigrant position that a sanctuary ordinance, such as San Francisco’s, is

required by Federal or State statute, regulation or court decision, regarding an individual
who has been convicted of a felony committed in violation of the laws of the State of
California, which is still considered a felony under State law. For purposes of this Section,
an individual has been “convicted” of a felony when: (a) there has been a conviction by a
court of competent jurisdiction; and (b) all direct appeal rights have been exhausted or
waived; or (c) the appeal period has lapsed.
However, no officer, employee or law enforcement agency of the City and County of
San Francisco shall stop, question, arrest or detain any individual solely because of the
individual’s national origin or immigration status. In addition, in deciding whether to
report an individual to the Federal agency charged with enforcement of the Federal
immigration law under the circumstances described in this Section, an officer, employee or
law enforcement agency of the City and County of San Francisco shall not discriminate
among individuals on the basis of their ability to speak English or perceived or actual
national origin.
....
Nothing herein shall be construed or implemented so as to discourage any person,
regardless of immigration status, from reporting criminal activity to law enforcement
agencies.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12.H.2 to 12.H.2-1 (1993).
86. Legal Issues in Connection with Proposed Amendment to Sanctuary Ordinance,
Memorandum from Buck Delventhal, Miriam Morley & Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Att’ys of S.F.,
to Mayor Gavin Newsom (Aug. 18, 2009).
87. Letter from Mayor Gavin Newsom to Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Bd. of Supervisors
(Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with author).
88. Jesse McKinley, San Francisco to Delay Reports on Charges Against Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2009, at A19.
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constitutional and does not contravene the principle that only the federal
government has the authority to regulate immigrants.
In this Section, I analyze these constitutional questions. First, I review the
approaches that two courts have used in reviewing sanctuary policies in two
different contexts to provide a starting point. One involves New York City’s
ordinance in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the
city’s Tenth Amendment challenge to federal statutes that appeared to disrupt the
protections afforded by the ordinance. The other is a California court of appeal
decision in favor of the LAPD’s special order that had been challenged on
preemption grounds. With those cases as a background, I look closer at the federal
statutes that set their sights on sanctuary ordinances and conclude that the federal
provisions have serious Tenth Amendment problems. Since sanctuary policies
primarily are enacted for public safety purposes, federal policies that intrude on
those goals face serious problems. Although most cities with such policies do not
restrain officers from voluntarily providing information to ICE out of fear that
such a restraint would violate the federal law, I believe that fear is unwarranted. If
the federal law mandates cooperation, serious commandeering problems arise
under the Tenth Amendment. However, assuming that the federal statutes survive
Tenth Amendment scrutiny, I then address the question of whether sanctuary laws
are preempted under the Supremacy Clause. I conclude that sanctuary policies that
bar local officials from asking crime victims and witnesses about immigration
status are not susceptible to preemption claims (field, implied, or conflict).
Sanctuary laws are about public safety and how to prioritize the spending of public
funds, not about regulating immigration.
A. City of New York v. United States
The City of New York directly challenged the constitutionality of two federal
antisanctuary laws—8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644—in the context of the city’s own
sanctuary ordinance in City of New York v. United States.89 The city argued that the
federal laws violated the Tenth Amendment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit disagreed.
Sections 1373 and 1644, which have similar language, are from parts of two
pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in 1996. The Welfare Reform Act, signed
into law by President Clinton in August 1996, contained a provision (section 434),
entitled “Communication between State and Local Government Agencies and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which became 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and
reads,
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and
89.

179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
The Conference Report accompanying the bill made clear that the purpose
was to encourage communication from subfederal officials to federal officials:
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority to
communicate with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, or
activities of illegal aliens. . . . The conferees believe that immigration law
enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the right to remain in the
United States undetected and unapprehended.90
Then in September 1996, Clinton signed an immigration reform law that
contained a provision (section 642) entitled “Communication between
Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which
essentially expanded on § 1644 and became § 1373:
(a) In General
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to,
or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional Authority of Government Entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State,
or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect
to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving
such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State,
or local government entity.
(c) Obligation to Respond to Inquiries
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify
or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within
the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by
providing the requested verification or status information. 91

90. H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2771.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-707 (1996).
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A Senate committee report accompanying this legislation explained that the
purpose of the law was to acquire and “exchange . . . immigration-related
information by State and local agencies” pertaining to the regulation of
immigration.92
After the enactment of these laws, the City of New York became concerned
that §§ 1373 and 1644 would jeopardize its sanctuary policy described above.93
Although no city officials claimed that the city had restrained them from
communicating with immigration officials, shortly after the laws went into effect,
the city sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the federal laws did
not invalidate the city’s Executive Order. The city complained that because
§§ 1373 and 1644 were aimed at state and local government entities, the laws
violated the Tenth Amendment. In essence, the city argued that Congress could
not restrict subfederal entities from controlling any immigration status
information they obtained as they saw fit. The city asserted that the federal law
was interfering with control of its own employees.94
The Second Circuit divided the city’s Tenth Amendment arguments into two
parts: (1) a state sovereignty claim that included the power to choose not to
participate in federal regulatory programs and to stop local officials from
participating even on a voluntary basis; and (2) a claim that the federal government
cannot act in a manner that disrupts the actual operation of state and local
government, such as by dictating the use of state and local resources or duties of
local officials.95 The city relied on Printz v. United States (federal gun control) and
New York v. United States (radioactive waste legislation), both Tenth Amendment
cases,96 to support its claim that states have a choice about participating in federal
regulatory programs and that the choice includes the ability to bar voluntary
cooperation by local officials.97
The Second Circuit did not agree with the city’s interpretation of Tenth
Amendment case law. The court was cognizant of the Tenth Amendment’s
language that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States . . . are reserved to
the States,” and the court acknowledged that “however plenary Congress’s power
to legislate in a particular area may be, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
from commanding states to administer a federal regulatory program in that area.
Moreover, ‘Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State’s officers directly.’”98 However, the court thought that §§ 1373 and 1644
were different. In Printz and New York, Congress improperly forced states to enact

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996).
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
City of New York, 179 F.3d at 33.
Id. at 34.
Both cases are discussed more fully below. See infra notes 162–71 and accompanying text.
City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34.
Id. at 33–34 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)).
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or administer federal regulatory programs.99
The central teaching of these cases is that “even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts,
it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts.”100 Congress may not, therefore, directly compel states or localities to enact
or to administer policies or programs adopted by the federal government. It may
not directly shift to the states enforcement and administrative responsibilities
allocated to the federal government by the Constitution.101
However, in the case of §§ 1373 and 1664, Congress was, in the Second
Circuit’s view, neither forcing subfederal entities to enact or administer a federal
program nor conscripting local officials to do federal work. The federal laws
simply prevented subfederal rule makers from “directly restricting the voluntary
exchange of immigration information” with the immigration officials.102
Based on its reading of the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Second
Circuit found the city’s rule problematic. By prohibiting any city officer or
employee from transmitting information regarding the immigration status of any
individual to federal immigration authorities, the executive order constituted a
mandatory noncooperation directive to even those workers who might want to
cooperate voluntarily. That directive was sufficient to forfeit the Tenth
Amendment protections as outlined in Printz and New York.103
The city also argued that the federal law violated the Tenth Amendment
because §§ 1373 and 1644 interfered with the city’s operations by regulating
confidential information obtained in the course of official business and seeking to
control the actions of city officials. In support of this argument, the city pointed
to Printz, where the Supreme Court also was critical of Congress for requiring
local police officers to report privately obtained “information that belongs to the
State and is available to them only in their official capacity,” as part of the Brady
bill.104 The city argued that §§ 1373 and 1644 would improperly take control of its
information, and that would violate its power to “determine the duties and
responsibilities” of its own employees.105
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged the federal policy’s interference
99. Id. at 34. In Printz, local law enforcement had to conduct background checks for gun
purchases, while in New York, state officials had to enact nuclear waste disposal rules and take title of
anything that was not properly disposed of. See infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
100. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (citations omitted).
101. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. After the City of New York case, the executive order in New York was changed to
make clear that immigration status is a proper subject of inquiry when required by federal officials,
and voluntary cooperation by local officials is not barred if they have that information. See City Policy
Concerning Immigrant Access to City Services, New York City Executive Order No. 34 (May 13,
2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_34.pdf.
104. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 36 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 n.17) (emphasis omitted).
105. Id.
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with “the City’s control over confidential information obtained in the course of
municipal business,” the court did not regard this as an “impermissible intrusion”
on the city’s authority.106 The only policy cited by the city that was disrupted was
the sanctuary executive order that “single[d] out a particular federal policy for
non-cooperation.”107 The city’s order did not prevent voluntary sharing of
immigration information with nonfederal immigration agents, suggesting to the
court that the Executive Order was not very “integral” to local government
operations.108
The Second Circuit’s analysis definitely leaves room for subfederal sanctuarystyle approaches in spite of §§ 1373 and 1644. Voluntary cooperation with ICE by
local officials cannot be thwarted by sanctuary rules according to the Second
Circuit.109 However, this assumes that local officials have information to share,
and the City of New York decision did not address the policy of instructing local
police to not ask about immigration status. Additionally, if the confidentiality
policy on immigration status is one that applies generally and is not exclusively
aimed at ICE, then the situation is quite different. Finally, nothing in the Second
Circuit’s opinion suggests that Congress or federal officials could force local
officials to gather immigration information about crime victims, crime witnesses,
or for that matter, arrestees.
As noted below, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment vis-à-vis New York City’s sanctuary policies also is subject to
criticism. The Second Circuit viewed §§ 1373 and 1644 as prohibitions from
restricting voluntary cooperation with immigration officials.110 However, if the
statutes are interpreted as a mandate to permit voluntary cooperation, then there
may in fact be a Tenth Amendment problem.111
B. Sturgeon v. Bratton
In Sturgeon v. Bratton,112 Judicial Watch filed a taxpayer lawsuit, on behalf of
Harold Sturgeon, against the LAPD in an attempt to put a stop to S.O. 40, the
department’s sanctuary policy that had been in place since 1979.113 Judicial Watch
is a conservative, educational foundation that boasts as one of its special projects

106. Id.
107. Id. at 37.
108. Id. As I argue below, I believe that the city’s argument for not asking about immigration
status—at least as far as crime victims and witnesses, and even minor offenders—is a good one in
terms of invoking the Tenth Amendment when the goal is public safety for everyone through gaining
the trust of immigrant communities. See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
109. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34–37.
110. Id. at 34–35.
111. See infra notes 146, 180 and accompanying text.
112. 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009).
113. Id. at 724; see also Tom Fitton, You Can’t Trust ACLU, JUDICIAL WATCH (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.judicialwatch.org/weeklyupdate/2010/01-you-cant-trust-aclu.
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the removal of undocumented immigrants.114 The action against the police chief
and others sought to enjoin enforcement of S.O. 40, the policy governing the
police department’s interaction with undocumented immigrants.
S.O. 40 bars LAPD officers from engaging in action when the sole purpose
is determining the immigration status of a suspect and arresting such persons for
the federal crime of illegally entering the United States. Stated broadly, S.O. 40
prevents LAPD officers from initiating investigations for the purpose of finding
violations of civil immigration laws and from arresting a suspect for an
immigration misdemeanor not committed in the officers’ presence.115 In an earlier
1987 case, the California Court of Appeal upheld S.O. 40 against a challenge that
the “mere questioning of a criminal arrestee about his immigration status” and
forwarding the information to the INS amounted to unconstitutional state
enforcement of federal civil immigration law.116 That court found that the U.S.
Constitution did not prevent the LAPD from voluntarily transferring arrest
information to federal authorities.117 Under S.O. 40, “undocumented alien status
in itself is not a matter for police action,” and S.O. 40 directs officers not to
“initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a
person.” However, “[w]hen an undocumented alien is booked for multiple
misdemeanor offenses, a high grade misdemeanor or a felony offense, or has been
previously arrested for a similar offense,” the arresting officer shall notify
Detective Headquarters Division of the arrest which, in turn, relays the
information to immigration officials.118
Subsequently in 1996, as noted above, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1373,
aimed at invalidating subfederal attempts to restrict local officials from voluntarily
providing immigration information to federal immigration officials.119 In Sturgeon v.
Bratton, the plaintiff Sturgeon argued that S.O. 40, as a local restriction, was

114. See Our Programs, JUDICIAL WATCH, http://www.judicialwatch.org/programs (last visited
Sept. 22, 2011).
115. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725.
[S.O.] 40 was promulgated by then Chief of Police Daryl Gates on November 27, 1979.
Special orders are directives issued by the chief of police which amend the LAPD Manual.
Although the parties and apparently, members of the community continue to refer to the
LAPD’s policy regarding illegal immigrants as “SO40,” the relevant provision is in the
LAPD Manual with a different section number. Volume IV, section 264.50 of the LAPD
Manual provides, “ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS.
Officers shall not initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien status of
a person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for violation of Title 8, Section
1325 of the United States Immigration Code (Illegal Entry).”
Id. at 724–25.
116. Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (Ct. App. 1987).
117. Id. Gates involved a challenge to LAPD procedures before and after S.O. 40, by
individuals encountered by LAPD prior to S.O. 40. The court of appeals concluded that the prior
procedures were flawed.
118. Id. at 595.
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006). The background to § 1373 is set forth in the discussion of City of
New York v. United States. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
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invalidated by § 1373. Namely, the plaintiff took the position that S.O. 40 violated
the Supremacy Clause because S.O. 40 conflicted with § 1373. Sturgeon also
argued that federal immigration law preempted S.O. 40.120
In turning down the challenge, the state court of appeals began by noting
that “[u]nder federal law, matters of immigration are handled by [ICE], a branch
of the Department of Homeland Security.”121 Although the Attorney General of
the United States may enter into a 287(g) agreement with local officials to help
carry out the function of immigration officers, this requires a voluntary agreement,
and the local officers would be subject to the supervision of federal officers.122
Although the Attorney General has the authority to use local law enforcement
officers to help respond in an emergency in dealing with a mass influx of aliens,
the Attorney General can only act “with the consent of the head of the
department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is
serving” in those circumstances.123
While the Sturgeon court did not rule on whether § 1373 violated the Tenth
Amendment, the court noted that the Tenth Amendment “shields state and local
governments from the federal government requiring them to administer federal
civil immigration law.”124 Although state law permits local police to enforce
federal criminal statutes,125 as a practical matter California police likely would
never make an arrest for misdemeanor illegal entry because California officers may
arrest for a misdemeanor only committed in the officer’s presence.126
Turning to the plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause and preemption claims, the
Sturgeon court also considered the language of § 1373(a) that prohibits local
authorities from stopping local officers from voluntarily cooperating with ICE.127
Section 1373(b) goes on to provide that no person or agency may prohibit or
restrict a local entity from “(1) sending such information to, or requesting and
receiving such information from, [ICE;] (2) maintaining such information[;] or (3)
exchanging such information with any other . . . government entity.”128 Finally, §
1373(c) requires ICE to respond to any inquiry by a federal, state, or local
government agency “seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration
status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose

120. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723.
121. Id.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2006).
123. Id. § 1103(a)(10).
124. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 724. The court’s approach appeared to assume that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 was constitutional.
125. Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597–98 (Ct. App. 1987).
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a) (West 2010).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
128. Id. § 1373(b).
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authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status
information.”129
In attempting to establish that S.O. 40 violates § 1373, the plaintiff took the
depositions of high-ranking LAPD officers (past and present), presumably in the
hopes of learning how S.O. 40 may have prohibited individual officer action that
violated § 1373. However, the plaintiff learned of no specific instance where S.O.
40 was applied. The plaintiff did not produce any evidence of individuals who had
been prohibited by S.O. 40 from sending to ICE officials information regarding
the immigration status of an individual, evidence of “individuals prohibited by
S.O. 40 from receiving information from immigration officials, maintaining
immigration information, and exchanging immigration information with any law
enforcement agency,” nor evidence of any officers who “complained about the
prohibitions” of S.O. 40.130
The plaintiff argued that S.O. 40 violated the Supremacy Clause simply
because S.O. 40 was impermissible under § 1373. To succeed with this facial
challenge, the court ruled that Sturgeon had to “establish that S.O. 40’s provisions
inevitably posed a present total and fatal conflict with section 1373”;131 a
hypothetical conflict would not suffice. So the court looked closely at the language
of the order and the federal statute. The text of S.O. 40 provides: “Officers shall
not initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien status of a
person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for violation of Title 8,
Section 1325 of the United States Immigration Code (Illegal Entry).” On the other
hand, § 1373(a) simply does not allow local officials from prohibiting local officers
from voluntarily communicating with ICE. In the court’s opinion, the language of
these provisions demonstrated no “total and fatal conflict.”132
In the court’s assessment, S.O. 40 simply does not address communication
with ICE which is the subject of § 1373; S.O. 40 addresses the initiation of police
action and arrests for unauthorized entry. On the other hand, § 1373(a) does not
address the initiation of police action or arrests for unauthorized entry; it
addresses only communication with ICE. In other words, S.O. 40 bars the
initiation of police action solely to discover immigration status, what might be
characterized as a “don’t ask” policy. However, if local officials are aware of
immigration status and want to communicate with federal officials, § 1373
protects those officials from a “don’t tell” policy. The court did not agree with
Sturgeon that the language of § 1373(a) restricting the “sending” of information to
ICE should be read to conflict with a prohibition on “obtaining information” that
could be sent to ICE.133 In the court’s view, § 1373(b) applies to restrictions on
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. § 1373(c).
Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 726 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id.
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local entities that deal with the maintenance and exchange of information.
Congress had the opportunity to prohibit restrictions on the obtaining of
immigrant status information by local entities, but did not.134
Moreover, if “in any way restrict[ing]” communication with ICE is read to
include obtaining information to give ICE, there would be no need for § 1373(b) to
specifically permit local entities to maintain immigration information and
exchange it with other governmental entities as maintaining such information and
obtaining it from other governmental entities makes the information available to
be transmitted to ICE.135
In short, the court felt that Sturgeon’s “strained interpretation” of § 1373
was not supported by the language of the statute.136
The heart of Sturgeon’s preemption claim was based on an alleged overlap
between S.O. 40 and § 1373 resulting in the federal law preempting the
department’s order. However, the plaintiff offered no evidence that, as applied,
S.O. 40 overlapped with the restrictions of § 1373. The court would not nullify the
order on preemption grounds simply based on a “hypothetical possibility” of
being applied in contravention to § 1373.137
The court acknowledged that the power to regulate immigration generally is
viewed as an exclusive federal power. However, that does not mean that every
subfederal regulation “touching on aliens” is invalid.138 Invalid state regulations of
immigration involve laws that determine who “should or should not be admitted
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”139
Short of that, the subfederal law is preempted only when compelled by
“affirmative congressional action.”140 Here, S.O. 40 is a “regulation of police
conduct and not a regulation of immigration,” so preemption did not apply.141
The court also concluded that S.O. 40 is not preempted on the grounds that
it conflicts with the intent of Congress in enacting § 1373 and “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment” of that intention.142 The goal of § 1373 was to
make sure that “the voluntary flow of immigration information” to ICE from
local officials was not restricted. Here, that “voluntary flow of immigration
information” was not affected between LAPD officers and ICE.143 S.O. 40

134. Id. As I explain later in the Article, in my view the Tenth Amendment would prohibit
Congress from requiring local entities to obtain immigration information under anticommandeering
principles.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 732.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing In re Jose C., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 687 (2009)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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concerns the initiation of investigations and does not bar any officers from
voluntarily contacting ICE. There was no evidence that S.O. 40 was applied or
interpreted in a way that conflicted with § 1373, and the court would not make any
assumptions to the contrary.144
C. The Tenth Amendment and Preemption
In order to place City of New York v. United States and Sturgeon v. Bratton in
proper context for evaluating sanctuary policies, we should step back a little, and
take a closer look at the Tenth Amendment and the preemption doctrine. We
need to ask whether federal laws violate the Tenth Amendment in precluding
sanctuary policies. We also need to know if sanctuary policies are threatened by
the preemption doctrine.
1. Tenth Amendment
A logical place to begin the constitutional analysis is in determining whether
the federal law with which sanctuary laws may be in conflict is valid. Namely, we
need to address the question of whether 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 are
constitutional before we need to concern ourselves with whether they preempt
sanctuary laws. Since the field of immigration is clearly within Congress’s province
to act, in answering the question of the constitutionality of these federal laws,
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence becomes relevant.
As discussed above, in City of New York v. United States, the city argued that 8
U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 were unconstitutional on the grounds that the federal
laws violated the Tenth Amendment by not allowing the city to control
immigration status information as it saw fit and interfered with control of its own
employees.145 The Second Circuit did not agree with the city’s Tenth Amendment
claim because the laws did not, in the court’s opinion, compel New York City to
enforce federal immigration laws; rather, the law simply forbade restrictions on
voluntary cooperation, and the court concluded that the Tenth Amendment did
not protect the states from passive resistance.146 Additionally, the court held that
the federal laws did not interfere with the city’s general police power to regulate its
operations without more evidence that the city’s ordinance was intended as a more
generalized restriction on the dissemination of confidential information.147

144. Id. Sturgeon also relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1644, “which prevents prohibitions or restrictions on
the communications between any ‘[s]tate or local government entity’ and ICE.” Id. at 725 n.6.
However, the court found that this case concerned communication between officers (not entities) and
ICE, so § 1644 was not relevant. Id.
145. See supra notes 89–111 and accompanying text.
146. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999).
147. In fact in 2001, “New York City voters responded by adopting an amendment to the
city’s charter embodying the structural privacy principles that the [Second Circuit] had tentatively
articulated,” in order to strengthen the city’s Tenth Amendment claim. Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
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A fair reading of the Supreme Court’s most recent cases on the Tenth
Amendment (including a Supreme Court case decided after the Second Circuit
decision) suggests that the Second Circuit’s reasoning is plausible with respect to
New York City’s policy at the time. However, the cases also suggest that the
constitutionality of the federal laws can turn on whether they are interpreted to
affirmatively mandate certain behavior by subfederal officials or simply prohibit
certain conduct. Whichever reading, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area
provides ample support for the constitutionality of sanctuary policies that do not
restrict voluntary cooperation with federal immigration authorities. However, in
spite of the Second Circuit’s opinion to the contrary, in my view, Supreme Court
jurisprudence is not definitive on the question of whether federal laws could
validly prohibit subfederal laws that restrict even voluntary cooperation with
federal officials.
The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” The Tenth Amendment has been interpreted
“to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress’s authority to
regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in
principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution.”148 And, “the
Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.”149
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court began using the Tenth Amendment more
boldly to place limits on congressional power. Under this approach, the Tenth
Amendment is a key protection of states’ rights and federalism. The idea is that
the Tenth Amendment reserves a zone of activity to the states for their exclusive
control, and federal laws intruding into this zone should be declared
unconstitutional.150
Three common justifications are offered for the use of the Tenth
Amendment in protecting federalism. “The first justification for protecting states
from federal intrusions is that the division of power vertically, between federal and
state governments, lessens the chance of federal tyranny.”151 “A second frequently
invoked value of federalism is that states are closer to the people and thus more
likely to be responsive to public needs and concerns.”152 Of course this value of
federalism could be inconsistent with the first value.
To the extent that voters at the state and local level prefer tyrannical rule

Amendment
(2008).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1215
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 (1988).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 313 (3rd ed. 2009).
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 314.
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or, more likely, rule that abuses a particular minority group, greater
responsiveness increases the dangers of subfederal government tyranny.
In other words, the substantive result of decreasing tyranny will not
always be best achieved by the approach of maximizing electoral
responsiveness; indeed, the reverse might well be the result. In fact, there
is a greater danger of special interests capturing government at smaller
and more local levels.153
This concern is important in understanding why subfederal anti-immigrant laws
do not earn Tenth Amendment protections, in my view.154 “A final argument
made for protecting federalism is that states can serve as laboratories for
experimentation.”155 In the words of Louis Brandeis: “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”156 But again, if local experimentation
tyrannizes a particular minority group (e.g., immigrants) then the values of the
Tenth Amendment are not achieved through protecting states’ rights.
The Tenth Amendment cases of the 1990s were grounded in the Supreme
Court’s 1976 case, National League of Cities v. Usery.157 There, the court declared
unconstitutional the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required
the payment of the minimum wage to state and local employees. “[T]here are
limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when

153. Id. at 314–15.
154. See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 315.
156. Id. Some have argued that local experimentation should be permitted in the immigration
field. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 567 (2008) (arguing that the “primary function state and local governments play [with regard to
migration management] is to facilitate the integration of immigrants into public life”); Peter H.
Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007) (advocating local
involvement in immigration because “in the administration and enforcement of immigration policy,
the federal government needs all the help it can get”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) (arguing that local participation serves as a “steam-valve”
for federal immigration policy). This argument has been made in response to scholars who have
concluded that local efforts to regulate immigration are generally preempted. See, e.g., Pratheepan
Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies and Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683 (2009); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006); Rick Su, A Localist
Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of
Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001);
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084
(2004). These articles on federalism and immigration offer theoretical suggestions. However, in this
Article, I rely on the actual approach that the Supreme Court is using with respect to federalism and
the Supremacy Clause.
157. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.”158
Requiring states to pay their employees the minimum wage violated the Tenth
Amendment because the law “operate[s] to directly displace the States’ freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”159
Forcing state and local governments to pay their employees minimum wage would
require that they either raise taxes or cut other service to pay these costs. This
would displace decisions traditionally left to the states and could “substantially
restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their
affairs.”160 Importantly, the court noted that Congress violates the Tenth
Amendment when it interferes with traditional state and local government
functions.161 Although the Court did not attempt to define all such traditional
functions, establishing a minimum wage was clearly one, and therefore the federal
requirement was unconstitutional.
Using these principles, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law that
violated the Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States in 1992.162 The federal
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act created a statutory duty for
states to provide for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes generated within their
borders. The Act provided monetary incentives for states to comply with the law
and allowed states to impose a surcharge on radioactive wastes received from
other states. Additionally, and most controversially, to ensure effective state
government action, the law provided that states would “take title” to any wastes
within their borders that were not properly disposed of by a certain date, and then
would “be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred.”163
Although Congress, pursuant to its authority under the commerce clause,
could regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes, the Court held that the “take
title” provision of the law was unconstitutional because it gave state governments
the choice between “either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according
to the instructions of Congress.”164 It was impermissible for Congress to impose
either option on the states. Forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive
wastes would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments, and requiring state
compliance with federal regulatory statutes would impermissibly impose on states
a requirement to implement federal legislation. Because of the Tenth Amendment
and limits on the scope of Congress’s powers under Article I, the Court ruled that
the “Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.”165 Allowing Congress to commandeer state
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 842.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 842–43.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 188.
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governments would undermine government accountability because Congress
could make a decision but the states would take the political heat and be held
responsible for a decision that was not theirs.166 In fact, if a federal law compels a
state legislative or regulatory activity, the law is unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment even if there is a compelling need for the federal action.167 Thus, the
central holding of New York is that it is unconstitutional for Congress to compel
state legislatures to adopt laws or state agencies to adopt regulations. However,
Congress may attach strings on grants to state and local governments and through
these conditions induce state and local actions that it cannot directly compel.168
A few years later, in Printz v. United States,169 the Supreme Court again used
the Tenth Amendment to strike down a federal statute. The Court held that the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth Amendment in
requiring that state and local law enforcement officers conduct background checks
on prospective handgun purchasers. Congress was impermissibly commandeering
state executive officials to implement a federal mandate. The Court felt that
Congress violates the Tenth Amendment when it conscripts state governments.
The Brady law was unconstitutional because it compelled state officers to act and
also violated separation of powers. The Constitution vests executive power in the
President, and Congress impermissibly gave the executive authority to implement
the law to state and local law enforcement personnel.170 The Court explained:
The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of
[chief law enforcement officers] in the fifty states, who are left to
implement the program without meaningful presidential control (if
indeed meaningful presidential control is possible without the power to
appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the
federal executive—to insure both vigor and accountability—is well
known. That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively
without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to
execute its law.171
Finally, in Reno v. Condon,172 a unanimous Court rejected a Tenth Amendment
challenge in upholding the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. The law “prohibited
states from disclosing personal information gained by departments of motor
vehicles, such as home addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, and

166. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 323–24.
167. Id. at 324.
168. Id. In the immigration enforcement area, when local police or sheriff’s departments enter
into INA section 287(g) agreements to assist in immigration enforcement efforts, funding is an
incentive that is provided to the local entities.
169. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
170. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 324–25.
171. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
172. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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medical information.”173 “The law was constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s
commerce clause power because ‘Congress found that many States . . . sell this
personal information to individuals and businesses [and these] sales generate
significant revenues for the States.’”174 The Court “stressed that the law is not
limited to state governments; it also regulates private entities that possess the
drivers’ license information” for resale and redisclosure.175 Most importantly, the
Court said that the law did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it was a
prohibition of conduct, not an affirmative mandate as in New York and Printz: “It
does not require the [state] Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does
not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating
private individuals.”176
Thus, Reno v. Condon can be interpreted as holding that Congress may
prohibit state governments from engaging in harmful conduct, particularly if the
law applies to private entities as well. However, we know from other Tenth
Amendment cases that Congress may not impose affirmative duties on state
governments. Whether this distinction between prohibition and obligation makes
sense can be questioned. Most duties can be characterized either way. The
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act could be characterized as imposing the affirmative
duty on states to keep information secret. Conversely, the Brady Act in Printz
could be characterized as a prohibition on state and local governments from
issuing gun permits without doing background checks. Also, it can be questioned
whether an otherwise impermissible regulation of state governments should
become acceptable because it includes private actors as well. Despite all these
questions, the court relies on a distinction between affirmative obligations and
negative prohibitions that is well established in constitutional law.177
Reno v. Condon, decided after City of New York, arguably lends support to the
Second Circuit’s decision because 8 U.S.C. § 1373 also does not require state
officials to assist in federal immigration law enforcement, but simply bars
restrictions on voluntary communications.178 On the other hand, one could argue

173. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 325.
174. Id. at 325–26 (quoting Reno, 528 U.S. at 143–44).
175. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 326.
176. Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.
177. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 326.
178. After Condon, the Supreme Court decided another commerce clause case that raised the
Tenth Amendment indirectly, providing some food for thought on the sanctuary issue. In Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), medical marijuana patients in California challenged the constitutionality of
provisions in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) that designates marijuana as contraband. Under
California law, the plaintiffs were authorized to use marijuana for their serious medical conditions, but
federal agents seized and destroyed their cannabis plants. The Supreme Court upheld the CSA, ruling
that federal regulation of marijuana was well within congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause. After the decision, the California Attorney General opined that under the Tenth Amendment,
the federal government’s decision to criminalize marijuana “for all purposes does not require
California to do the same.” Letter from Jonathan K. Renner, Deputy Att’y Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t
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that § 1373 is more than a “prohibition of conduct” in that it mandates subfederal
jurisdictions to enact laws that bar officials from preventing the discussion of
immigration status. In Reno v. Condon, the federal law barred state governments
(and private actors) from selling private information, and the court labeled the
federal law a prohibition. However, if a sanctuary law barred local officials from
asking about immigration status, a federal law that sought to prevent such local
restrictions could just as well be labeled a mandate or a prohibition.
Where does the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence leave us in the context of
federal laws (8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644) that prohibit bars on voluntary
communication about immigration status between local officials and federal
authorities because of sanctuary laws? We know that Congress could not mandate
that subfederal law enforcement officials ask about immigration status without
stepping into the minefield of anticommandeering language of cases like Printz and
New York v. United States. Congress cannot require subfederal law enforcement
officers to enforce federal immigration laws. In that respect, §§ 1373 and 1644 are
certainly on safe footing because they contain no such affirmative mandates. We
also know that a sanctuary policy that permits voluntary communication between
local authorities and federal officials is probably fine.179 The murkier question is
whether federal prohibitions against subfederal laws that prevent voluntary
communications between local officials and federal officials are valid under the
Tenth Amendment.
The only decision that has come close to addressing this question is the
Second Circuit’s City of New York case, which leaves some room for interpretation
under a different set of facts. Certainly, the decision suggests that the federal
prohibitions against laws that close off voluntary cooperation do not violate the
Tenth Amendment because they do not force subfederal entities to enact or
administer a federal program nor conscript local officials to do federal work.180
However, the court’s approach to the question of whether the federal provisions
interfered with the city’s operations by regulating confidential information
obtained in the course of official business and seeking to control the actions of
city officials leaves an important opening. On the facts in City of New York, the
Second Circuit refused to conclude that there was an “impermissible intrusion”
of Justice, to Robert D. Tousignant, Chief Counsel, Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., Department of
Health Services’s Questions Regarding Medical Marijuana Identification Cards and Federal Law (July
15, 2005), available at http://aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ca_attorney_general_ltr.pdf. Relying on Printz
and New York, the attorney general decided that even though state law enforcement officers knew the
identities of state authorized medical marijuana users, officers were not required to arrest such
individuals under the CSA. Id. The attorney general did concede, however, that state identity records
could be subject to a federal subpoena. Id. This is arguably analogous to the sanctuary situation: local
authorities are not required to enforce federal immigration laws or to ask about immigration status;
once the immigration status is known, however, the federal law provides that the state cannot stop an
officer from voluntarily turning over information to federal authorities.
179. This preemption issue is discussed below. See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.
180. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1999).

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

IMMIGRATION SANCTUARY POLICIES

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

279

into city business because the sanctuary policy “singled out” federal immigration
officials in declining to share immigration status information.181 To the court, that
was evidence that the Executive Order was not “integral” to local government
operations.182 The clear implication is that if local officials are barred from
gathering and sharing immigration status information to all interested parties
because of important public policy considerations, the outcome in the Second
Circuit case could have been different.
This is an important lesson for those supporting sanctuary policies. By
explaining that the policies are based on community or preventive policing policy
goals of gaining the trust of all parts of the community for public safety reasons,
federal policies that would intrude on those goals could very well run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment. In other words, even though §§ 1373 and 1644 are couched in
terms of precluding bars on voluntary communications, those requirements
arguably mandate local laws that do not interfere with voluntary communications,
but in the process that mandate interferes with the administration of local public
safety decisions. Local requirements that bar the seeking and sharing of
immigration status information to all would be strong evidence of a serious public
policy decision relating to public safety. In my view, therefore, sanctuary policies
aimed at preventing local law enforcement officials from delving into the
immigration status of criminal victims, witnesses, or minor offenders would be
shielded by the Tenth Amendment against federal attempts to delve into that
information even under the guise of permitting voluntary communications. Much
in the way that the Supreme Court has deferred to state governments in their
discrimination against lawful permanent residents in the area of state public
functions employment because of legitimate state public interests,183 public safety
and community policy goals of sanctuary ordinances are expressions of public
policies on spending and enforcement priorities that also deserve deference.
This reading of the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence may be controversial.
Not surprisingly, jurisdictions such as San Francisco, New York City, and Los
Angeles retain language in their policies that bar sharing of information “unless
required by federal law,” presumably responsive to the voluntary communication
protections of §§ 1373 and 1644. The City Attorney of San Francisco even has
gone so far as to advise that a local official who voluntarily communicates
immigration status information to ICE officials is not to be disciplined under the
local sanctuary ordinance.184 These examples demonstrate a concession, however
181. Id. at 36–37.
182. Id. at 36.
183. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
184. “[I]f the City attempted to enforce the new [sanctuary ordinance] policy by disciplining
an employee for violating it, the City could be exposed to damages for unlawful termination.” Legal
Issues in Connection with Proposed Amendment to Sanctuary City Ordinance, Memorandum from
Buck Delventhal, Miriam Morley & Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Att’ys of S.F., to Mayor Gavin
Newsom, at 5 (Aug. 18, 2009) (on file with author).
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unnecessary in my view, on the part of local policy makers that §§ 1373 and 1644
are constitutional. They take a defensive posture thinking that this position is
necessary to defend against claims that their sanctuary policies are not preempted
by valid federal law. In my view, their concession is unnecessary because §§ 1373
and 1644 have Tenth Amendment problems when they attempt to force local
cooperation when resistance is based on a sanctuary policy premised on public
safety and spending judgments.
2. Preemption of State and Local Laws
If one assumes that §§ 1373 and 1644 do not violate the Tenth Amendment,
the next question is whether federal law preempts sanctuary policies. Under
Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it are
the supreme law of the land. When federal and state laws conflict, the state law
must yield: “[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine
is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power,
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”185
Although preemption may appear, at first glance, to be a straightforward
concept, in fact there is not a bright-line rule for deciding whether a state or local
law should be invalidated on preemption grounds. Traditionally, the Supreme
Court has identified two major situations where preemption occurs. One is where
a federal law expressly preempts state or local law. The other is where preemption
is implied by a clear congressional intent to preempt state or local law.
In Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association, the Court noted that
the tests for preemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled
whether Congress’s command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.186 Of course, express and implied
preemption can interact. Even when statutory language expressly preempts state
law, Congress rarely is clear about the scope of what is preempted or how
particular situations should be handled. Courts must decide what is preempted,
and this inevitably is an inquiry into congressional intent. Conversely, implied
preemption is often a function of both perceived congressional intent and the
language used in the statute or regulation. The problem, of course, is that
Congress’s intent, especially as to the scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or
clear. In fact, I argue below that while 8 U.S.C. § 1373 may have been intended to
protect the voluntary exchange of information between local law enforcement and
federal immigration authorities, the law does not (and probably could not)
mandate local police to ask crime victims and witnesses about immigration
status—the heart of sanctuary and confidentiality policies. In fact, the federal
statute does not mandate asking about the immigration status of arrested

185.
186.

Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted).
Id. at 98.
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individuals prior to conviction.187 Congressional intent must be clear to find
preemption because of a desire, stemming from federalism concerns, to minimize
invalidation of state and local laws.
[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law
causes of action. In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in
which Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purposes of Congress.”188
Within the implied preemption situation, three types of implied preemption
have been identified. One is termed “field preemption” where the scheme of
federal law and regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”189 The second is
where there is a conflict between federal and state law. Even if federal law does
not expressly preempt state law, preemption will be found where “compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”190 Finally,
implied preemption also will be found if state law impedes the achievement of a
federal objective. Even if federal and state law are not mutually exclusive and even
if there is no congressional expression of a desire to preempt state law,
preemption will be found if state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.”191
These categories frequently overlap in practice, and congressional intent, if it can
be found, can be determinative.
Provisions in federal statutes expressly preempting state and local laws
inevitably require interpretation as to their scope and effect. The explosion of
litigation concerning the preemption provision in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) demonstrates this. ERISA broadly
preempts state laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans.192 A key problem,
though, is the inherent ambiguity in the phrase “relates to.” The spectrum of
modifiers to the term is potentially wide—directly, slightly, remotely. Thus,
employers and others have argued that many state laws—from family leave to
workers compensation to health care finance to malpractice claims—are
preempted by ERISA because they “relate to” employee benefit plans. The sheer
quantity of ERISA litigation shows that an express preemption provision leaves
open countless questions about the scope of that preemption. Therefore, simply

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
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pointing out that a subfederal law or policy “relates to” immigration is not
sufficient to strike it down on preemption grounds.
a. Field Preemption
Even without express preemption, the Court will find implied preemption if
there is a clear congressional intent that federal law should exclusively occupy a
field. The Court has said that such preemption exists if “either . . . the nature of
the regulated subject matter permits no other exclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained.” So field preemption can be found either if Congress
expresses a clear intent that federal law will be exclusive in an area or if
comprehensive federal regulation evidences a congressional desire that federal law
should completely occupy the field. Intent can be found from a “scheme of
federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it.”193
The subjects of foreign policy and immigration provide examples of field
preemption. When it comes to managing foreign affairs, the federal government
has sole authority, so a state attempt to regulate in the area would be preempted.
However, how far the Court would go to strike down a state or local law on
preemption grounds is a challenge when the law has an “indirect effect” on
immigration or foreign affairs.194
A good example is Hines v. Davidowitz.195 Pennsylvania enacted a law that
required all immigrants to pay a registration fee and carry a state identification
card—a process that the federal government already required. The Supreme Court
struck down the state registration law on preemption grounds because registration
“is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our
government that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to
demand broad national authority.”196 In what serves as a standard description of
federal immigration power, the Court emphasized the “broad and comprehensive
plan describing the terms and conditions upon which aliens may enter this
country, how they may acquire citizenship, and the manner in which they may be
deported.”197 Pervasive federal regulation existed, and in the context of the
Pennsylvania statute, a federal law already specifically required alien registration
with the federal government.
Hines is significant because even though the state law technically
complemented and did not interfere with the federal law, the Court still found
preemption. The fact that the Court relied on field preemption also is noteworthy
because no direct preemption language was contained in the federal immigration
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 402.
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 69.
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law. Thus, as Dean Chemerinsky points out, “Field preemption means that federal
law is exclusive in the area and preempts state laws even if they serve the same
purposes as the federal law and do not impede the implementation of federal
law.”198
Interestingly, in the challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the state argued that its
law complements federal law, but as we can see, the Hines decision is not helpful
to Arizona. In fact, in the Arizona case, the federal court of appeals has agreed
with the federal government’s argument that the state law actually interferes with
the federal government’s enforcement plan.199 However, whether preemption
should be found in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration is
ultimately “a tension between the desire to effectuate the interests of the federal
government and the desire to limit the instances where state power is limited.”200
Putting the field preemption principles announced in Hines to use, the
Supreme Court struck down a California law that barred aliens ineligible for
citizenship from purchasing commercial fishing licenses.201 The Court’s language
was clear:
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining
what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may
remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms
and conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states
are granted no such powers . . . . State laws which impose discriminatory
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the
United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to
regulate immigration.202
Again, Arizona’s defense of S.B. 1070 finds no help in a case like Takahashi
because the state law definitely puts a discriminatory burden on the entrance of
lawful immigrants insofar as its terms can lead to racial profiling of citizens and
lawful residents.203
Similarly, in Toll v. Moreno,204 the Court invoked preemption in striking a
Maryland law that denied to “non-immigrant aliens” in-state tuition that was
accorded to citizens and to “immigrant aliens.” The Court found preemption
based on the “broad principle that ‘state regulation not congressionally sanctioned
that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible
if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.’”205 The state had
directly contravened the federal approach to G-4 aliens (employees of
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 403.
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 350–52 (9th Cir. 2011).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 403.
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
Id (emphasis added).
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 360–66 (9th Cir. 2011).
458 U.S. 1 (1982).
Id. at 12–13 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976)).
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international organizations and their dependents). Federal law permitted them to
establish domicile and afforded significant tax exemptions on organizational
salaries. In such circumstances, the Court could not conclude that Congress ever
contemplated that a State, in the operation of a university, might impose
discriminatory tuition charges and fees solely on account of the federal
immigration classification. Therefore the state bar on G-4 aliens from acquiring
in-state status violated the Supremacy Clause.
However, in De Canas v. Bica, although the Court reminded that the “[p]ower
to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,”206 a state
employer sanction law was not preempted because there the California law was
about protecting lawful workers from unauthorized workers. The Court noted:
[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised. . . .
[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a
regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain.207
Not all state regulations of aliens are ipso facto regulations of immigration.208 “In
this case, California sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal standards in
imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employed
aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country; even if such
local regulation had some purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration.”209 The Court reasoned that “it does not thereby become a
constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be
powerless to authorize or approve. Thus, absent congressional action, [the state
law] would not be an invalid state incursion on federal power.”210
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 211 the Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed its approach in De Canas, holding that the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Arizona’s Legal Arizona
Workers Act (not to be confused with the subsequently enacted S.B. 1070 that is
the subject of separate litigation), which targets employers who hire
undocumented immigrants and revokes their state business licenses. IRCA, which
included a federal employer sanction law punishing employers who knowingly hire
unauthorized workers, contains an express preemption provision, as well as a
savings clause: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law
206. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354.
207. Id. at 355.
208. Id.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Id. In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress did in fact enact a
federal employer sanction law that likely preempted the California law upheld in De Canas.
211. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
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imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”212 The Court held that the Legal
Arizona Workers Act fits within Congress’s intended meaning of licensing law in
IRCA’s savings clause and is therefore not preempted. The Court also held that
the INA, which makes the use of E-Verify voluntary, does not impliedly preempt
Arizona from mandating that employers use the E-Verify system.
De Canas and Whiting remind us that without express preemption, states
possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the state. Child labor laws, minimum and
other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen’s
compensation laws are only a few examples. As I argue below, sanctuary policies
similarly fall within these broad police powers to promote public safety through
policies that are designed to gain community trust and allocate enforcement
resources in accordance with those policies.
Of course, even state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must
give way to paramount federal legislation. But the Court in De Canas v. Bica and
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting would not
presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state
authority to regulate the employment relationship covered by [the state
law] in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws. Only a
demonstration that complete ouster of state power—including state
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws—was “the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress” would justify that conclusion.213
In contrast to De Canas, where the Court found that the state had an
important economic goal behind its enactment of an employer sanction law,214
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s no-renting-to-undocumentedimmigrants ordinance present different questions. While those jurisdictions might
offer an economic basis for the law, evidence is quite clear that the real purpose
behind the laws is regulation of immigration—an area that is preempted by federal
law. For example, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed and supports S.B. 1070
because the federal government “is not doing its job” of securing the border.215
S.B. 1070 is about the regulation of immigration for its allies and Brewer.216 When
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
213. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted).
214. Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that a California law imposing a moratorium on the
construction of nuclear power plants was not preempted because its main purpose was economics
and not safety; the state withstood a preemption challenge that Congress had intended to preempt the
field of nuclear regulation. 461 U.S. 190, 216, 222–23 (1983); see infra notes 231–35 and accompanying
text.
215. Howard Fischer, Will SB1070 Remain on Hold?, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Nov. 2, 2010,
http://azdailysun.com/news/state-and-regional/article_cfd0ac68-343a-5fc5-97d1-2464db66d7e8.html.
216. The Ninth Circuit noted the immigration purpose behind S.B. 1070:
In April 2010, in response to a serious problem of unauthorized immigration along the
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Hazleton, Pennsylvania, enacted its ordinance, its supporters made clear that their
intent was the control of Latino immigrants:
The consequences which this immigration disaster holds for our children
[are] horrendous. Coloreds will take political control of more states, along
with both houses of Congress and the presidency. Whites will quickly be
stripped of their rights with our wealth confiscated for redistribution to
non-whites as is taking place in South Africa. . . . Will America become
the United States of Mexico?217
Unfortunately for lawmakers in Arizona and Hazleton, they do not have the
authority to regulate immigration.
Thus, in litigation challenging Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Hazleton’s ordinance,
the federal courts have had little difficulty in finding that the laws are preempted.
In the Arizona case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction of
the primary provisions of the law on preemption grounds: the requirement that
local law enforcement verify the immigration status of all arrestees; the new state
law making it a crime for failing to carry immigration papers; another new law that
made it a crime to apply for work without proper documentation; and the attempt
to authorize local police to enforce the civil provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.218 The court agreed with the federal government that its
enforcement plan would be thwarted by Arizona’s law and was therefore
preempted as an improper state attempt to regulate immigration.219 Although the
Third Circuit’s decision on the Hazleton ordinance has been vacated for
reconsideration in light of the Whiting decision, the court initially found that the
no-renting-to-undocumented-immigrants provision was an attempt to “regulate
which [immigrants] may live [here].”220 In other words, the ordinance attempted
to regulate immigration, and was therefore preempted.
b. Conflict Preemption
If federal law and state law are mutually exclusive, so that a person could not
simultaneously comply with both, the state law is deemed preempted. The
Supreme Court has explained that such preemption exists when “compliance with
Arizona-Mexico border, the State of Arizona enacted its own immigration law
enforcement policy [S.B. 1070, which] “make[s] attrition through enforcement the public
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.”
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 2011).
217. Transcript of Record Vol. 2 at 5–6, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06-CV-1586), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/lozano2.pdf.
218. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 366.
219. Id.
220. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011). The Supreme Court has asked the Third Circuit to reconsider Lozano in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). However,
as long as the evidence reveals that the purpose behind the Hazleton ordinance is the regulation of
immigration, the ordinance faces serious preemption problems nonetheless.
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both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility.”221 The difficulty with
regard to this type of preemption is in deciding whether there is a conflict between
federal and state law.
There also are many harder cases that depend on determining federal intent
in order to decide whether the federal law and state law are mutually exclusive. For
example, if a state law conflicts with a federal goal, the state law can still be
preempted even though there is no conflict with a specific federal law and in the
absence of field preemption. In short, the state law is preempted if it “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or objectives
of Congress.”222 Thus, in Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Court
determined that the filing of unfair labor practices was a primary purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act.223 Any law that punished such a filing, such as the
denial of unemployment benefits, was preempted. Likewise, in Perez v. Campbell,
the Court ruled that the suspension of a driver’s license under state law was
preempted by federal bankruptcy laws because the debt arising from an auto
accident had been discharged by the bankruptcy court.224 Otherwise, the
uniformity goals of the federal bankruptcy laws with respect to debts would be
thwarted by state law.
In a challenge to an immigration package enacted by the Alabama state
legislature, a federal district court judge upheld two provisions over conflict
preemption arguments advanced by the federal government. In United States v.
Alabama,225 the provisions that have been allowed to go into force include the
authority of local law enforcement officers to detain or arrest anyone who is
reasonably suspected of being undocumented and if a person is arrested for
driving without a license and the officer is unable to determine that the person has
a valid driver’s license, the person must be transported to the nearest magistrate;
and a reasonable effort shall be made to determine the citizenship of the driver.226
221. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
222. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
223. Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
224. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
225. No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941, at *19 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
226. The contract provision lists two exceptions, that “[n]o court of this state shall enforce the
terms of, or otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in
the United States.” Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Final Consent Judgment,
Perez v. GTX Auto Import & Auto Repair, LLC, No. CV 2010-904012, (Cir. Ct. Jefferson County
Ala. Oct. 24, 2011), available at http://media.al.com/spotnews/other/Judge%20Vowell%20Immigration%
20Order%2010.24.2011.pdf. An Alabama Circuit Judge has pointed, however, that the anticontracting
provision still has to overcome a big obstacle—the Alabama state constitution’s command that
There can be no law of this state impairing the obligation of contracts by destroying or
impairing the remedy for their enforcement; and the legislature shall have no power to
revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any
statute of this state. After suit has been commenced on any cause of action, the legislature
shall have no power to take away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to
such suit.
Id. Because the opinion deals with a breach of contract suit that was filed by an undocumented
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On the other hand, the district court did strike down on conflict grounds the
Alabama provision that would make it a state crime for an unauthorized alien to
solicit or perform work in the state. The court found that the provision directly
contravened Congress’s decision as part of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 that unauthorized work by the worker should not be criminalized.227
If enforced, this provision would stand as an obstacle to IRCA’s employer
sanctions scheme.228 Similarly, the district court struck down the state’s attempt to
make it a state crime to harbor or transport an undocumented alien, to establish a
civil cause of action against an employer who fails to hire a citizen while hiring an
unauthorized worker, and to forbid employers from claiming a business tax
deduction for wages paid to an unauthorized worker. Furthermore, even though
the district court initially upheld four controversial provisions—one making it a
state misdemeanor for an undocumented person to carry an alien registration
document, a second that required public schools to check immigration status of
school children for data purposes, and two others attempting to restrict the right
of undocumented immigrants to enter into private contracts and business
transactions with a state agency—the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
enjoined those four provisions.229
c. Impeding Federal Objective
The challenge in conflict preemption cases often “lies in determing the
federal objective and whether a particular type of state law is consistent with it.”230
A comparison of two particular Supreme Court cases is instructive. Pacific Gas &
Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission231 involved a
state moratorium on nuclear power plant construction, while Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Association232 involved a state law enacted for the health and
safety of workers handling hazardous wastes.
In Pacific Gas & Electric, California halted new nuclear power plants until a
state commission could certify that the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes could
be done safely. The company wanted to proceed with new construction plans,
arguing both that the state law was preempted in the nuclear regulation field by
immigrant before the law took effect, the opinion merely holds that the anti-immigrant law cannot
constitutionally be applied to those suits because “the legislature shall have no power to take away”
people’s right to pursue contacts claims that are already pending. Id. Nevertheless, the state court also
suggests that the entire anticontracting provision may violate the state constitution’s requirement that
no law may “destroy[ ] or impair the remedy” for enforcing a contract in court. Id.
227. Alabama, 2011 WL4469941, at *21.
228. Id. at *25.
229. United States v. Alabama, Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Governor of Alabama, No. 1114532-CC slip op. at 13–15 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011), modified, No. 11-14532-CC, (11th Cir. Mar. 8,
2012).
230. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 413.
231. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
232. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
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congressional intent and that the state law interfered with the federal goal of
developing nuclear power. However, the Court ruled in favor of the state,
determining that Congress’s goal related to public safety, while California’s interest
was economic. Congress might intend that the federal government have exclusive
control over regulating safety, but “the States retain their traditional responsibility
in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need,
reliability, costs, and other related state concerns.”233 The state’s primary purpose
was economics and “not radiation hazards. . . . Without a permanent means of
disposal, the nuclear waste problem could become critical, leading to
unpredictably high costs to contain the problem or, worse, shutdowns in
reactors.”234
The approach of the Court in Pacific Gas & Electric, is revealing:
Thus, in determining whether the California law interfered with
achieving the federal objective, the Court had to make two major choices:
One was in characterizing the federal objective; the other was in
characterizing the state law and its purpose. If the Court saw a broad
purpose for the Atomic Energy Act in encouraging the development of
nuclear power, then the state law, which obviously limited it, would be
preempted. The Court avoided preemption by more narrowly
characterizing the federal goal as promoting nuclear reactors only when
they were economically feasible.
Additionally, if the Court characterized California’s purpose as
ensuring safety before construction of nuclear power, then the law would
have been preempted. The Court avoided preemption by accepting
California’s claim that its goal was economics, even though the law was
written in terms of preventing construction of nuclear plants unless the
safety of disposal was ensured.
The Pacific Gas & Electric case thus illustrates how preemption
determinations are very much based on the record and the context of the
particular case. It also shows how much the outcome turns on the
manner in which the Court chooses to characterize the purposes of the
federal and state laws.235
In Gade, the Court confronted a similar question but reached a different
outcome. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and related
federal regulations regulated the health and safety of workers who handled
hazardous waste materials. Illinois enacted its own law that sought to protect the
health and safety of such workers. The state argued that its purpose was not
limited to the workers’ health and that public safety was a chief purpose.
However, the Court rejected Illinois’s argument ruling that the federal law

233.
234.
235.

Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 205 (1983).
Id. at 213–14.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 414.
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“preempts all state law that constitutes in a direct, clear and substantial way,
regulation of worker health and safety.”236
Arguably, Gade is out of step with Pacific Gas & Electric. In Pacfic Gas &
Electric, the Court was open to California’s two reasons for halting new nuclear
power plants—public safety and economics. However, the Court was not open to
Illinois’s two reasons for regulating workers—worker health and public safety.
One could argue that the California nuclear power moratorium was inconsistent
with the federal goal of encouraging more nuclear power and that the Illinois law
complemented the federal interest in worker health. However, preemption was
avoided in Pacific Gas & Electric because the Court placed more emphasis on the
state economic purpose, while preemption was found in Gade because the Court
was more impressed with the broad federal purpose in hazardous waste worker
safety.237
The point is that preemption based on state laws interfering with a federal
goal turns on how the court characterizes the federal purpose. If a court wants to
avoid preemption, it can narrowly construe the federal objective and interpret the
state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose. But if a court
wants to find preemption, it can broadly view the federal purpose and preempt a
vast array of state laws as it did in Gade.238
In the S.B. 1070 situation, the Ninth Circuit used a conflict preemption
technique in addressing the Arizona provision that made it a state crime for an
unauthorized alien to seek employment in the state. Congress made an
“affirmative choice not to criminalize work as a method of discouraging
unauthorized immigrant employment . . . .”239 Arizona argued that provisions of
S.B. 1070 were intended to further “the strong federal policy of prohibiting illegal
aliens from seeking employment in the United States.”240 However, by “pulling
the lever of criminalizing work—which Congress specifically chose not to pull,”
the Arizona law becomes an obstacle to the execution of Congress’s goals and
objectives; the Arizona law was a “substantial departure from the approach
Congress” chose to address the problem.241
In contrast, sanctuary policies appear immune from preemption if we accept
that their goals are about public safety and represent economic decisions on how
to spend policing resources and are not about regulating immigrants. Indeed, the
language of most sanctuary policies speaks in terms of not expending resources
and personnel time asking about immigration status.242

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Gade, 505 U.S. at 107.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 416.
Id.
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 359 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 360.
See infra notes 319–25 and accompanying text.
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3. Martinez v. Regents of University of California—An Analogous Example
The California Supreme Court recently decided a preemption case involving
a state law that, like sanctuary policies, sends a message of inclusion to
undocumented immigrants. Under state law, California state universities permit
undocumented college students who meet certain requirements to pay in-state
tuition rates.243 In Martinez v. Regents of University of California, a unanimous state
supreme court found that the tuition law was not preempted by a federal statute
that prohibits states from making unlawful aliens eligible for postsecondary
education benefits under certain circumstances.244
In Martinez, plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizen residents of other states,
challenged the California law, arguing that the state policy violated federal law and
that they too should be eligible to pay in-state tuition fees. The main legal issue
was this: The federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1623, provides that an alien not lawfully
present in this country shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a state for
any postsecondary education benefit unless a U.S. citizen is eligible for that
benefit.245 In general, nonresidents of California who attend the state’s colleges
and universities must pay nonresident tuition.246 But California Education Code
section 68130.5(a) exempts from this requirement students—including those not
lawfully in this country—who meet certain requirements, primarily that they have
attended high school in California for at least three years. The question to the
court was whether this exemption violated § 1623.
The court held that section 68130.5 does not violate § 1623. The exemption
is given to all who have attended high school in California for at least three years
(and meet the other requirements), regardless of whether they are California
residents. In other words, some who qualify for the exemption qualify as
California residents for purposes of in-state tuition, but some do not.
Furthermore, not all unlawful aliens who would qualify as residents but for their
unlawful status are eligible for the exemption. In essence, the exemption is not
based on residence in California. Rather, it is based on other criteria.
Asserting a field preemption theory, the plaintiffs argued that federal
immigration law preempted the state statute. The state supreme court
acknowledged that the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount, that
Congress has the power to preempt state law, and that the power “to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”247 However, the court
reminded us that,

243. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
244. 241 P.3d 855, 870 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2961 (2011); 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006).
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(b). Section 1623 was enacted on September 30, 1996, as part of the
omnibus Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, § 505, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (1996).
246. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68050 (Deering 2011).
247. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 861 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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While the immigration power is exclusive, it does not follow that any and
all state regulations touching on aliens are preempted. Only if the state
statute is in fact a “regulation of immigration,” i.e., “a determination of
who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain,” is preemption
structural and automatic. Otherwise, the usual rules of statutory
preemption analysis apply; state law will be displaced only when
affirmative congressional action compels the conclusion it must be.248
In the court’s view, because section 68130.5 does not “regulate[ ] who may
enter or remain in the United States, [it would] proceed under the usual
preemption rules.”249
Plaintiffs contend that section 68130.5 violates this statute, i.e., that
section 68130.5 makes an unlawful alien eligible for a benefit (in-state
tuition) on the basis of residence without making a citizen eligible for the
same benefit. When it enacted section 68130.5, the Legislature was aware
of section 1623. Indeed, Governor Gray Davis had vetoed an earlier
version of what eventually became section 68130.5 because he believed
section 1623 would require that the same exemption from nonresident
tuition be given to all out-of-state legal United States residents. During
the legislative process leading to section 68130.5’s enactment, the state
Legislative Counsel issued an opinion concluding that the provision
would not conflict with section 1623. Ultimately, in an uncodified section
of the bill enacting section 68130.5, the Legislature found that “[t]his act,
as enacted during the 2001–02 Regular Session, does not confer
postsecondary education benefits on the basis of residence within the
meaning of Section 1623 of Title 8 of the United States Code.”250
Plaintiffs’ central argument was that section 68130.5’s exemption from
paying out-of-state tuition is based on residence. Section 1623(a) prohibits a state
from making unlawful aliens eligible “on the basis of residence within a State” for
a postsecondary education benefit.251 However, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the exemption is based on other criteria, specifically, that persons
possess a California high school degree or equivalent; that if they are unlawful
aliens, they file an affidavit stating that they will try to legalize their immigration
status; and, especially important here, that they have attended “[h]igh school . . . in
California for three or more years.”252 Indeed, both before and after section
68130.5’s enactment, the law has been that unlawful aliens cannot be deemed
California residents for purposes of paying resident tuition.253 Moreover, many
248. Id. at 861–62 (quoting In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1098 (Cal. 2009)).
249. Id. at 862 (quoting In re Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1098).
250. Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted).
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006).
252. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5(a)(1), (2), (4) (Deering 2011).
253. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062 (Deering 2011); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201 (1990).
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unlawful aliens who would qualify as California residents but for their unlawful
status, and thus would not have to pay out-of-state tuition, will not be eligible for
section 68130.5’s exemption—only those who attended high school in California
for at least three years and meet the other requirements are eligible for the
exemption.
The California court noted that if Congress had intended to prohibit states
entirely from making unlawful aliens eligible for in-state tuition, it could easily
have done so. It could simply have provided, for example, that “an alien who is
not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible” for a postsecondary
education benefit.254 But it did not do so; instead, it provided that “an alien who is
not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence
within a State” for a postsecondary education benefit.255 So § 1623 did not preclude
California’s approach.
Plaintiffs urged the court to consider Congress’s overall purpose in its
immigration legislation in support of their expansive view of § 1623. After all, in
determining Congress’s intent, courts may also consider the “structure and
purpose of the statute as a whole.”256 Congress has provided statements of
national policy concerning immigration. It stated that “[i]t continues to be the
immigration policy of the United States that . . . the availability of public benefits
not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States”257 and that “[i]t
is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”258 In the court’s view,
this general immigration policy may have supported an absolute ban on unlawful
aliens receiving the exemption, but § 1623 does not impose an absolute ban.
In the California court’s view, the fact that the state legislature’s primary
motivation in enacting section 68130.5 was to give unlawful aliens who reside in
California the benefit of resident tuition in a way that does not violate § 1623 did
not doom the state law. The legislature found and declared that “[t]here are high
school pupils who have attended elementary and secondary schools in this state
for most of their lives and who are likely to remain, but are precluded from
obtaining an affordable college education because they are required to pay
nonresident tuition rates”; and that “[t]hese pupils have already proven their
academic eligibility and merit by being accepted into our state’s colleges and
universities.”259 While this description appears to apply primarily to unlawful
aliens, the court found that nothing is legally wrong with the legislature’s attempt
254. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 862 (Cal. 2010).
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
256. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
257. 8 U.S.C § 1601(2)(B) (2006).
258. 8 U.S.C § 1601(6).
259. 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 814, § 1, subd. (a)(1), (2). The sentiment is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s sentiment in Plyler v. Doe that reminded us why it is important not to foreclose public
education to undocumented students at the K-12 level. See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
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to avoid § 1623. The mere desire to avoid the restrictions provides no basis to
overturn the legislation. This is relevant to sanctuary policies that may be drafted
in a manner to avoid preemption or conflict with federal law in order to benefit
undocumented immigrants; careful drafting to avoid conflict does not render the
policy invalid.
Plaintiffs in Martinez also argued that section 68130.5 had a preemption
problem with 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Section 1621 was enacted in August 1996, shortly
before § 1623, as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA).260 But the state court disagreed with the
plaintiffs on that point as well.
Section 1621 has two parts: (1) a general rule that unlawful aliens are not
eligible for state or local public benefits (§ 1621(a)); and (2) a description of the
circumstances under which a state may make an unlawful alien eligible for those
public benefits, namely, by “affirmatively” expressing the benefit (§ 1621(d)).261 So
in order to comply, the state statute must expressly state that it applies to
undocumented aliens, rather than conferring a benefit generally without specifying
that its beneficiaries may include undocumented aliens. The California court noted
that if Congress had intended to require more, Congress should have said so
clearly and not set a trap for unwary legislatures.
Plaintiffs argued generally that section 68130.5 is impliedly preempted
260. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249, 1251, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
261. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections
(b) and (d) of this section, an alien who is not—
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title),
...
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) of this
section).
...
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this subchapter the
term “State or local public benefit” means—
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by
an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local
government; and
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar
benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or
family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds
of a State or local government.
...
(d) State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State and local public
benefits
A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is
eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be
ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a State law
after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §411.
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through both field preemption and conflict preemption because of 8 U.S.C. §
1621. The idea is that Congress’s intent to preempt can “be inferred if the scope
of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative
field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.”
The California court disagreed. Critical to the implied preemption analysis is
the existence of two express preemption statutes, namely §§ 1621 and 1623.
However, in this case, Congress did not merely imply that matters beyond the
preemptive reach of the statutes are not preempted; it said so expressly. Section
1621(c) says that a state “may” provide public benefits for unlawful aliens if it
does so in compliance with the statute’s requirements. This language shows
Congress did not intend to occupy the field fully. Because section 68130.5
complies with the conditions set out in both §§ 1621 and 1623, those statutes
cannot impliedly preempt it.262
Strangely, plaintiffs relied substantially on League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson,263 which held that federal law preempted the restrictions that
Proposition 187, a voter initiative enacted in 1994, had placed on unlawful aliens.
Provisions of Proposition 187 denied K–12 access to undocumented students and
denied certain public benefits to undocumented immigrants. The court regarded
Wilson as irrelevant to the issues in Martinez. Relying heavily on § 1621, the federal
district court in Wilson concluded that California “is powerless to enact its own
legislative scheme to regulate alien access to public benefits.”264 But the court
added that California “can do what the PRA [including § 1621] permits, and
nothing more.”265 The California court felt that the Wilson opinion indicated what
§ 1621 barred, but left open the question of what § 1621 permits. And the
California court in Martinez ruled that California’s tuition scheme was well within
what is permitted. In short, section 68130.5 was not impliedly preempted.

262. Although the California Supreme Court did address this issue, Congress’s definition of
restricted “public benefits” does not appear to cover in-state tuition anyway:
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this subchapter the
term “State or local public benefit” means—
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided
by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local
government; and
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar
benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or
family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds
of a State or local government.
8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) (2006). Furthermore, Congress’s attempt to restrict state or local benefits appears
to raise serious Tenth Amendment problems; restricting state or local benefits that are not necessarily
funded by federal dollars would appear to be beyond the reach of Congress.
263. 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
264. Id. at 1261.
265. Id.
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The Martinez, Whiting, and De Canas cases teach us that carefully drafted
subfederal laws that affect immigrants can avoid preemption problems. When the
federal statute leaves room for state restrictions that serve a legitimate state
purpose and do not in and of themselves regulate immigration, the subfederal
action can be upheld. Under the Supreme Court’s preemption discourse, sanctuary
policies that require local police to refrain from asking crime victims and witnesses
about immigration status appear quite safe from any preemption claims (field,
implied, or conflict). If 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 withstand Tenth Amendment
scrutiny and are interpreted to bar subfederal policies that prevent the voluntary
cooperation of a local officer with a federal officer, then as long as the local
policies do not bar voluntary cooperation, no conflict with the federal statute
arises. Whether a subfederal law that bars officers from asking about immigration
status during traffic stops and other minor encounters is preempted by §§ 1373
and 1644 may turn on whether the bar on asking is interpreted as being a restraint
on voluntary cooperation. The DOJ inspector general has determined that at least
three high profile “don’t ask” sanctuary jurisdictions do not prevent such
voluntary cooperation, which suggests no conflict with federal law. Although the
inspector general was aware that Oregon and San Francisco have official sanctuary
policies, and that New York City’s executive order did the same, “in each instance,
the local policy either did not preclude cooperation with ICE or else included a
statement to the effect that those agencies and officers must assist ICE or share
information with ICE as required by federal law.”266
The question of whether sanctuary policies that bar officers from asking
about immigration status would be preempted is also informed by the Pacific Gas
& Electric case. The case illustrates how preemption determinations are very much
based on the record and how the outcome turns on the manner in which the
Court chooses to characterize the purposes of the federal and subfederal laws. In
that case, the Court characterized the federal goal as promoting nuclear reactors
only when they were economically feasible, rather than simply as encouraging the
development of nuclear power. Conveniently, the Court characterized California’s
state law purpose as economic, rather than in terms of preventing construction of
nuclear plans unless disposal was safe.
In the sanctuary context, if §§ 1373 and 1644 are construed to simply make
sure that voluntary cooperation is not thwarted when a subfederal officer has
information and wants to communicate, then a sanctuary policy based on a public
policy decision to not ask about immigration status for effective community
policing reasons does not conflict. The fact that “don’t ask” sanctuary policies
generally come in the form of a decision to not spend public funds and resources
on delving into immigration questions is more evidence that the decision is one

266. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE
REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 23 (2007).
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about public expenditures for policing—something that is conventionally a local
decision. Thus, the subfederal jurisdiction’s reliance on careful deliberation
relating to public safety in its decision to initiate a sanctuary policy is an important
part of the record.
IV. GOOD POLICING
The processes used by local governments and police departments in deciding
to implement sanctuary policies reveal that their primary goal is public safety for
the entire community. The long, often painstaking, deliberations have little to do
with thwarting enforcement efforts by federal immigration officials. The goal
simply is better policing.
Consider the process in New Haven, Connecticut.267 In establishing its
policy of making no distinction between documented and undocumented
immigrants, the New Haven Police Department made clear that its mission and
goals were to “protect life and property, prevent crime, and resolve problems.”268
Determining the immigration status of the city’s residents was not part of its
mission. Local policymakers drew a direct analogy between its program and the
military’s former “don’t ask, don’t tell policy.”269
Policymakers in New Haven gave serious consideration to what was
happening in the community in arriving at their decision. The police department
has stations in the two main immigrant neighborhoods. Each month, the
commander of each station holds a meeting with residents to discuss community
issues and concerns. In these meetings, the commanders learned that
undocumented residents were reluctant to attend; they usually expressed their
concerns through a local Catholic priest.270 Prior to the adoption of the formal
policy, officers in these neighborhoods attempted to gain the trust of the
immigrant communities through intensive outreach that met with some success.
However, some police practices—particularly those related to questions about
immigration status or identification documents—were misinterpreted, and
immigrants often complained about disrespectful police behavior.271 This dialogue
and the input from immigrant advocacy groups led to the creation of a new policy
for the department as well as the city’s launch of a municipal identification card
program for all residents irrespective of immigration status.272 New Haven’s
immigrant-friendly image is one that the city has worked hard to promote through
267. See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
268. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 4–5.
271. Id. at 5.
272. Id. at 6. Although some officers do not understand the process and stringent
requirements for the identification cards, in general, New Haven police officers regard the card as a
good tool that helps them identify city residents, saving time and resources by eliminating the need to
hold a person until documents are authenticated. Id. at 9.
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special programs and policies, all with the purpose of “ensuring the safety of all of
its residents, including undocumented persons.”273
Better policing was the motivation for hammering out the current approach
to immigrants in Prince William County, Virginia, as well. Evidence of that
motivation is symbolized by the process that the police chief followed in order to
convince local politicians to modify their plans to implement a very strict antiimmigrant approach to public safety.274 The community was highly polarized over
the issue of immigration. Anti-immigrant protests, email campaigns, and town hall
testimony by hundreds of residents pressured county board members. Ultimately
the board unanimously approved a policy that restricted social services for
undocumented immigrants, instructed the police to enter into a 287(g) agreement
with ICE, and required officers to ask about any detained person’s immigration
status “if there is probable cause to believe such a person is in violation of federal
immigration law.”275
Throughout the volatile process, the police chief urged restraint and a
balanced approach because, he said, “I have a responsibility to provide service to
the entire community—no matter how they got here. It is in the best interest of
our community to trust the police.”276 He feared that the board action would
increase the number of “silent victims” in immigrant communities, as the
department’s relationship with the community soured and public trust eroded.277
The chief insisted that the order to detain individuals suspected of being
undocumented was problematic and could lead to “racial profiling” litigation
against the department.278 After consulting with other police departments and the
county attorney, the county board of supervisors revised the policy in two ways:
(1) immigration status inquiries are not required unless the person is arrested, not
simply detained, and (2) the inquiry is made of every person arrested, not just
those suspected of being foreign born.279 Thus, crime witnesses and victims are
not subject to questioning about immigration status.
In contrast to Prince William County, Montgomery County, Maryland, was
regarded as having political leadership that was much more liberal and accepting
of undocumented immigrants. The police chief in Montgomery County addressed
the issue proactively. Certainly, he wanted to get undocumented immigrant
criminals “off the streets,” but the policy had to “allow officers to maintain the
relationships that they had worked to build within various communities.”280 He
did not want his officers to be in the business of enforcing federal immigration
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 10.
See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text.
HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15–17.
Id. at 15–16 (quoting Police Chief Charlie T. Deane).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 21–22.
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laws because that would make it difficult for police “to foster trust and
cooperation with everyone in these immigrant communities.”281 His meetings with
community residents provided the chief with opportunities to clarify any
misunderstandings, and the input he received influenced his plan. The policy that
was ultimately adopted does require forwarding names of persons arrested and
charged with certain serious crimes. However, inquiries about immigration status
are not made of crime witnesses and victims. The chief learned of misinformation
to the contrary, so he constantly engaged in community outreach on the policy to
dispel rumors.282
The sanctuary policies for crime victims and witnesses developed in Phoenix
and Mesa, Arizona, are also grounded on a theory of public safety and the
promotion of better policing. In Phoenix, the focus is on violent crime and on
maintaining a positive relationship with the immigrant community. As one officer
put it, “The Phoenix Police Department can’t afford to squander the trust
issue. . . . When we come out of the immigration cloud, we must have our
reputation and trust intact.”283 The department constantly invests time and
resources into improving communications with the immigrant community and to
respond to criminal activity irrespective of immigration status.284 The department
knows that the cooperation of all residents—even those who are in
undocumented status—is required to ensure the safety of the entire community.285
The philosophy in Mesa, Arizona, is similar. The mayor and police officers
were openly critical of Sheriff Arpaio’s operations in their city because his actions
undermined the police department’s relationship with the immigrant community
and “set back the Police Department’s efforts to build trust.”286 While trust and
community confidence are the goals behind the police department’s policy of not
inquiring about immigration status when it comes to crime victims and witnesses,
the battle is difficult because the distinction between federal (ICE), county
(Arpaio), and local (police department) law enforcement is confusing for the
immigrant community. As one officer put it, “You’re not sure if you ever gain the
trust. Maybe you just lessen the mistrust.”287 In spite of the tense atmosphere over
immigration in Arizona, the Mesa police chief was determined not to adopt a
policy that would damage the trust of a significant part of the community who
were often victims or witnesses to crime. He held community meetings to
encourage residents to discuss priorities and communication and consulted ICE.
A new policy finally was adopted after seventeen revisions, followed by several

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 22 (quoting Police Chief J. Thomas Manger).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 39 (quoting Police District Commander Steve Stahl).
Id. at 40.
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months of officer training.288 Although the city takes pains not to be labeled a
“sanctuary” for undocumented immigrants, perhaps for political reasons, the
focus of the policy is on criminals, not crime victims or witnesses, and the
department engages in continuous outreach to the immigration community.289 In
testimony before Congress, Mesa’s police chief made clear why the immigration
status of crime victims and witnesses needs to remain off the table:
Community policing efforts are being derailed where immigrants who
fear that the police will help deport them rely less on the local authorities
and instead give thugs control of their neighborhoods.
. . . . It is nearly impossible to gain the required trust to make community
policing a reality in places where the community fears the police will help
deport them, or deport a neighbor, friend or relative. 290
The goal of gaining trust in immigrant communities as an important step in
achieving public safety for the entire community through sanctuary policies is
evident in many other jurisdictions:
 In San Jose, California, the police chief has warned that using a
shrinking pool of officers to target undocumented immigrants is
inefficient, costly and would make cities more dangerous, not less.
Looking to reassure its own large and growing Latino community,
San Jose has long broadcast that it does not participate in
immigration raids. Officers are ordered not to investigate someone’s
immigration status even during arrests. San Jose police officers are
looking to greatly improve their frayed relationship with immigrant
communities amid allegations of overaggressive policing and racial
profiling. The chief also discontinued a policy in which cars of
unlicensed drivers stopped for minor traffic violations were
impounded for a month—a policy many felt unfairly targeted the
undocumented Latino community.291
 Officials in Providence, Rhode Island, ironically where Danny Sigui
was deported after testifying as a witness in a 2003 murder trial,292
want to opt out of ICE’s Secure Communities program293 because
the “success of [the] city’s community policing program has been
based on the trust developed between law enforcement and the

288. Id. at 42.
289. Id. at 43.
290. Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration
Laws: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong.
84 (2009) (testimony of George Gascón, Chief, Mesa Police Dep’t, Mesa, Ariz.).
291. Sean Webby, San Jose: Chief Says Local Cops Shouldn’t Be Involved in Immigration Enforcement,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2011.
292. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 332–34 and accompanying text (describing the Secure Communities
Program).
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community—especially the immigrant community.” City leaders
worry that the Secure Communities program will breed fear and
mistrust, undermining community policing practices. Witnesses and
crime victims—including documented and undocumented
immigrants—may shy away from the police, fearing that contact may
lead to immigration problems.294
The Minneapolis Police Department has had a policy in place for
years that prohibits officers from asking about immigration status.
That policy predates a city ordinance, passed in 2003, that prohibits
all city employees from inquiring about immigration status.295 Police
understand that building trust is a challenge for immigrant
communities, including newcomers like Somalis. With the sanctuary
policy as a foundation and using bilingual interpreters, the police
work to establish trust by building relationships through regular
meetings and conversations with community members, accessing
Somali radio shows, distributing flyers in neighborhoods, and even
making door-to-door visits.296
Takoma Park, Maryland, adopted a sanctuary ordinance in 1985 that
prohibits all local officials from releasing any information regarding
the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to any third
party. The city reaffirmed this policy in 2007 by declaring that
“enforcement of immigration laws by the Takoma Park Police
Department will discourage immigrant residents from reporting
crimes and suspicious activity, and cooperating with criminal
investigations; and . . . as a matter of public safety, the protection of
a person’s citizenship and immigrant status will engender trust and
cooperation between law enforcement officials and immigrant
communities to aid in crime prevention and solving, and will
discourage the threat of immigrant and racial profiling and
harassment.”297
Speaking in support of his department’s community policing policies,
the police chief of Lowell, Massachusetts pointed out, “When
immigrant residents of Lowell are afraid to report crimes because
they worry that contact with my officers could lead to deportation,
criminals are allowed to roam free and the entire community suffers
as a result.”298
The state of Oregon has a statewide sanctuary law prohibiting police
agencies and local governments from using any resources to

294. Gregory Smith, Providence Wants to Opt Out of ‘Secure Communities’ Database, PROVIDENCE
J., Feb. 23, 2011.
295. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 50.
296. Id. at 51–52.
297. City of Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance No. 2007-58 (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://
www.takomaparkmd.gov/clerk/agenda/items/2007/102907-2.pdf.
298. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 6.
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apprehend or report undocumented immigrants.299 The state’s largest
city—Portland—has its own official sanctuary ordinance as
well. Both measures are promoted as important steps in developing
trust in immigrant communities to insure public safety for all
residents.300
The sanctuary policies discussed in this article fall within what some refer to
as “community oriented policy,” “confidentiality policies,” or “preventive”
policing.301 They prohibit immigration status inquiries of individuals not suspected
of having committed crimes.302 The success of these policies “hinges upon the
development of trust between community residents and law enforcement officials.
For communities with significant immigrant populations, building trust means
getting immigrants to know that if they are victimized by crime or they witness a
crime, they can approach the police and not fear immigration-related
consequences.”303 These policies are premised in part on the fact that immigrants
are often victimized by criminals who assume that no report will be made out of
fear of being deported.304
By whatever name—sanctuary policies, confidentiality practices, community
policing—state and local rules that require law enforcement officers to refrain

299.

OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2007).
Enforcement of federal immigration laws.
(1) No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision
of the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting
or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign
citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, a law enforcement agency may
exchange information with the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and the
United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in order to:
(a) Verify the immigration status of a person if the person is arrested for any
criminal offense; or
(b) Request criminal investigation information with reference to persons
named in records of the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services or
the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, a law enforcement agency may
arrest any person who:
(a) Is charged by the United States with a criminal violation of federal
immigration laws under Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act or 18 U.S.C.
1015, 1422 to 1429 or 1505; and
(b) Is subject to arrest for the crime pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by a
federal magistrate.
Id.
300. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 7. In Portland, the relationship between immigrant
communities and police improved as police-community dialogue gave immigrants a better sense of
security. Id.
301. See supra note 32.
302. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND
LOCAL POLICE 3 (2007).
303. Id. at 2.
304. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 7.
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from asking crime witnesses, crime victims, and, in some instances, minor
offenders about immigration status are intended to promote public safety. Their
goal is to gain the immigrant community’s trust—trust that is needed for the
community’s cooperation. Through that cooperation, the entire community is
safer. The policies are adopted as measures of good policing.
V. GOOD PUBLIC POLICY
The success of sanctuary policies is evident:
As departments around the country embraced community policing,
crime rates dropped substantially. Between 1993 and 2005, violent crime
rates fell 57 percent for the general population, and 55 percent for the
Latino population. The downward trend was attributed in many state and
local police agencies, in part, to community policing strategies.305
These good policing measures have indeed turned into good public policy
decisions that have achieved greater public safety.
Not surprisingly, law enforcement organizations have come to recognize the
positive public policy ramifications of sanctuary policies. According to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), one of the “central
benchmarks of a well-commanded police department is establishing good
relationships with the local communities, including those composed of
immigrants. Working with these communities is critical in preventing and
investigating crimes.”306 The IACP warns,
Immigration enforcement by state and local police could have a
chilling effect in immigrant communities and could limit cooperation
with police by members of those communities. Local police agencies
depend on the cooperation of immigrants, [documented and
undocumented], in solving all sorts of crimes and in the maintenance of
public order. Without assurances that they will not be subject to an
immigration investigation and possible deportation, many immigrants
with critical information would not come forward, even when heinous
crimes are committed against them or their families. Because many
families with undocumented family members also include legal immigrant
members, this would drive a potential wedge between police and huge
portions of the legal immigrant community as well.
This will be felt most immediately in situations of domestic violence.
For example, many law enforcement agencies have been addressing the
difficult issues related to domestic abuse and the reluctance of some
victims to contact the police. This barrier is heightened when the victim
is an immigrant and rightly or wrongly perceives her tormentor to wield

305.
306.
21 (2007).

NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 302, at 2.
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION ISSUES
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the power to control her ability to stay in the country. The word will get
out quickly that contacting the local police can lead to deportation or
being separated by a border from one’s children. Should local police
begin enforcing immigration laws, more women and children struggling
with domestic violence will avoid police intervention and help.307
The IACP cautions cannot be taken lightly: the prevalence of mixed families
(families with both documented and undocumented members) in the United
States and the particular challenge that domestic violence presents render the need
for immigration confidentiality particularly high.
The reticence to call police that is born of fear that lack of immigration
status will “trump the criminal justice protections afforded crime victims” is a
concern that reaches far beyond immigrant communities.308 If victims are deterred
from calling the police, criminals will not be held accountable. That leaves
perpetrators free to commit other crimes, perhaps against U.S. citizens and lawful
resident aliens.309
In spite of these data that verify the decline of crime rates in sanctuary
localities and situations that demand confidentiality, critics argue that sanctuary
policies forestall the removal of dangerous criminal immigrants.310 However, a
2007 audit by the DOJ Office of Inspector General found that sanctuary or
confidentiality policies “did not violate federal law and did not impede police
cooperation with ICE regarding criminals in police custody.”311 Thus, the claim of
obstruction appears meritless.
When the Department of Justice audited programs that received federal
criminal assistance funds to defray costs of incarcerating criminal aliens, special
attention was paid to jurisdictions that had sanctuary policies to determine if
police cooperation with ICE was impeded. In fact, when auditors looked closely at
the state of Oregon and San Francisco (two jurisdictions with sanctuary laws) as
well as New York City (because of its executive order), “in each instance the local
policy either did not preclude cooperation with ICE or else included a statement
to the effect that those agencies and officers will assist ICE or share information

307. GENE VOEGTLIN, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION
LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (2004), available at
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnforcementconf.pdf.
308. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Leslye Orloff, Director of the Immigrant Women
Program of Legal Momento and cofounder of the National Network to End Violence Against
Immigrant Women).
309. Id.
310. For example, this “sanctuary cities resource” website, which keeps track of sanctuary
jurisdictions, maligns those jurisdictions that have adopted sanctuary policies. About the Sanctuary Cities
Resource Site, http://www.sanctuarycities.info/sanctuary_cities_about.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2011).
The website claims that these jurisdictions are “defying ICE and other federal agencies whose goal it
is to reduce terrorism and keep criminals and other law breakers out of the United States.” Id.
311. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 302, at 4.
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with ICE as required by federal law.”312 There simply is no truth to the assertion
that serious criminal aliens are averting immigration consequences because of
sanctuary policies. In the words of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff in 2007, “I’m
not aware of any city . . . that actually interfered with our ability to enforce the
law.”313 Once a noncitizen is convicted of a serious offense, the person is reported
to immigration authorities in every sanctuary jurisdiction.
In contrast, serious public policy problems can arise in cities that do not have
clear sanctuary or confidentiality policies. Community trust in the police can be
eroded, and public safety for everyone can be negatively affected. For example, in
2007, the New Jersey Attorney General issued a directive ordering police to
question individuals about their immigration status upon arrest for a serious crime.
If an officer has “reason to believe” that such an individual is an undocumented
immigrant, the individual must be referred to ICE. However, the directive was
silent as to whether police should question a person about immigration status and
refer to ICE in other contexts, such as traffic stops or street encounters. A survey
of sixty-eight individuals referred to ICE by New Jersey law enforcement officials
when only a minor offense or no offense was charged revealed troubling data:
 Sixty-five were Latino;
 Forty-nine were questioned about their immigration status and turned
over to ICE following a traffic stop, either based on a minor
infringement, such as rolling through a stop sign, or based on no
identifiable reason at all (forty-one as drivers, eight as passengers); and
 Nineteen were stopped by police on the street and questioned about
their immigration status (seven for drinking in public, the others for no
apparent reason at all).314
In addition to these individuals, other persons who were witnesses or victims
of crime also were questioned about their immigration status. One man called the
police after he had been assaulted on the street by two men. The victim was
detained for two days and transferred to ICE custody because he could not
produce any identification.315 Police questioned another man in his home as part
of the investigation of a neighbor. The police detained the man after asking about

312. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE
REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES viii, x–xi, 27–28 (2007).
313. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 9. One might be concerned that sanctuary policies would
hamper efforts to deal with criminal aliens or even terrorists. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,
Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006). However, the
assurances by Secretary Chertoff and the DOJ audit should dispel such concerns.
314. BASSINA FARBENBLUM & JESSICA JANSYN, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
CROSSING THE LINE: DAMAGING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES BY NEW JERSEY
POLICE FOLLOWING ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE 2007-3, at 4 (2009).
315. Id. at 15.
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his immigration status.316 Individuals involved in car accidents were detained after
police arrived and asked about immigration status.317
These incidents send the wrong message to immigrant communities for
those who are concerned about public safety for the entire community. Little
wonder that victims and witnesses are hesitant to come forward if they fear being
questioned about their own immigration status. In the words of the former
Newark Police Chief,
The reluctance of local police to enforce federal immigration law grows
out of the difficulty of balancing federal and local interests in ways that
do not diminish the ability of the police to maintain their core mission of
maintaining public safety, which depends heavily on public trust. In
communities where people fear the police, very little information is
shared with officers, undermining the police capacity for crime control
and quality service delivery. As a result, these areas become breeding
grounds for drug trafficking, human smuggling, terrorist activity, and
other serious crimes. As a police chief . . . asked, “How do you police a
community that will not talk to you?318
Voicing similar concerns about the aftereffects of a joint operation by federal
agents and Chandler, Arizona police, the Attorney General of Arizona at the time,
Grant Wood, called for an investigation because the operation “created an
atmosphere of fear and uncertainty [that] greatly harmed the trust relationship”
between police and residents.319
In contrast, police took a preventive police approach in Austin, Texas, when
they realized that forty-seven percent of reported robbery victims were Latino,
even though Latinos constituted only twenty-eight percent of the population and
many robberies went unreported.320 Police initiated an outreach campaign to the
Spanish-speaking community to encourage undocumented residents to report
crimes if they were victims or witnesses. Their message was clear: “Trust us. We
are not immigration, we are not going to arrest you, and we are not going to
deport you.”321 A twenty-percent increase in robbery reports followed. But then
the police did more. To reduce the victimization of undocumented residents, they
negotiated with banks to accept Mexican consul-issued identification cards for

316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Fed. Immigration Laws:
J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law and the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 81–82
(2009) (statement of Hubert Williams, President, Police Foundation).
319. DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS 189 (2005).
320. Id. at 191.
321. Id.
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purposes of opening bank accounts. Undocumented residents no longer had to
hide or carry their cash around, and robberies declined.322
In short, sanctuary policies are a better public policy choice. They work.
They encourage trust—a necessary ingredient to problem-solving community
policing models, providing hope to police departments across the country.323 They
promote public safety for everyone.
Sanctuary policies also are good public policy in an era when, unfortunately,
anti-immigrant rhetoric that breeds hatred and distrust runs high in many quarters;
and at times, the hate turns violent.324 Sanctuary policies are important emblems
of inclusion, public statements that counter the vitriol spawned by misguided
souls. Sanctuary policies make sense because, like it or not, undocumented
immigrants are a part of the community and shunning them does harm to all of
us. Sanctuary policies send a message of rapport and trust.
The Supreme Court confronted an analogous public policy decision in 1982
when it struck down Texas’s attempt to deny undocumented children access to
elementary and secondary public schools. Even though undocumented status was
not deemed a suspect classification and the right to education was not regarded as
fundamental, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court noted,
[M]any of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will
remain in this country indefinitely, and . . . some will become lawful
residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely
adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.
It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these
children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.325
This remarkable statement of inclusion was an important philosophical
policy announcement that also was wise as a practical matter—the entire country
would pay the price if these students were not afforded the opportunity to be
educated.
Similarly, the entire community loses when we force a segment into the
shadows of mistrust and fear of local law enforcement officials. Many in the socalled undocumented community will someday become lawful residents and
citizens. Many are members of mixed families where a parent, a child, or a sibling
already is a lawful resident or citizen. Most interact with other residents of the
entire community on a daily basis and might be present to witness a crime or

322. Id. at 192–93.
323. Id. at 222.
324. See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 441 (2002).
325. Id. at 230.
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provide aid to someone who is in trouble. The members of these communities
need to be integrated, not shunned, for good public policy reasons.
Governmental institutions need to play a lead role in integration efforts, and
sanctuary policies set the necessary tone. The influence of local leaders and
government agencies can have overwhelmingly positive and immediate effects on
the lives of immigrants. Important forms of civic engagement are not predicated
on formal U.S. citizenship. Schools, neighborhoods, community groups, and
public service programs can all benefit from the immediate involvement of
immigrants. The alternative—as illustrated in the hellish environment created by
Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County, Arizona326—breeds fear and distrust
within the immigrant community, while promoting hate by misguided community
residents who follow Arpaio’s lead. Rejecting the Arpaio world through alternative
public policy choices is a legitimate decision that should be promoted.
VI. CLOSING
In the interest of public safety, thousands of law enforcement agencies
across the country engage in some form of sanctuary policy—officially or
unofficially.327 This is an important message of inclusion, integration, and outreach
to immigrant communities in our increasingly diverse nation. Official numbers
likely understate the actual level of de-emphasis that local law enforcement
officials practice when it comes to checking the immigration status of individuals
they encounter for minor matters, traffic offenses,328 or as crime witnesses or

326. Prior to Arizona S.B. 1070, Sheriff Arpaio received widespread attention for his
immigration enforcement antics pursuant to a 287(g) agreement with ICE. As part of his aggressive
enforcement practices, Arpaio trained deputies to use minor traffic violations as an opportunity to
check individuals’ legal status. At Arpaio’s county jail, prisoners were forced to wear black-and-white
striped uniforms, with pink socks and underwear. Randy James, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, TIME (Oct. 13,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929920,00.html. In opening a new jail
facility, he ordered seven hundred maximum-security prisoners to march four blocks to a new jail
facility wearing only pink underwear and flip-flops. Id. Arpaio, who refers to himself as the “toughest
sheriff” in the country is under investigation for breaking civil rights laws. Pierre Thomas, Controversial
Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Under Investigation for Allegedly Violating Civil Rights, ABC NEWS (Sept. 13,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-investigation-us-department-justice/
story?id=11556736. The allegations include: “unlawful searches and seizures, discriminatory police
conduct, and a failure to provide basic services to individuals with limited English.” Id. The Justice
Department also has filed a lawsuit accusing Arpaio of obstructing the department’s civil rights
investigation. Id.
327. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
328. I realize that for traffic stops, if the driver does not offer at least a form of identification
that is acceptable to the officer, this can lead to immigration status questioning. That makes the
issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants vitally important. Short of that, the issuance
of local municipal identification cards that are acceptable to local police (as in New Haven) or the
recognition of Mexican Consul-issued matriculas are very necessary. An incident in sanctuary-friendly
San Francisco underscores the problem. Katie Worth, Driver’s Arrest Ignites Sanctuary City Debate, S.F.
EXAMINER (July 10, 2010), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/driver-s-arrest-ignites-sanctuary-citydebate. On June 2, 2010, police stopped a driver who failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.
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victims. Even without an “official” sanctuary policy, the officer’s choice is one
born of a sense that most folks in these categories that they encounter who are
likely immigrants should be allowed to go about their lives without an intrusion
from federal immigration officials. Even if they are not intending to send a
message of inclusion, these officers find it unwise, or at least unnecessary, to send
an Arizona S.B. 1070 message of unwelcome.
The constitutionality of sanctuary policies is clear. Unlike anti-immigrant
subfederal laws intended to regulate immigration, sanctuary policies, community
policing, and confidentiality approaches are not about regulating the admission of
immigrants. Sanctuary policies are about public safety and decisions on how to
spend public funds and establish priorities, and therefore are not preempted.
Congress cannot commandeer local authorities to enforce federal immigration
laws. Thus, as long as sanctuary communities that choose not to ask about
immigration status do not bar volunteer communications and follow other federal
requirements of cooperation, they clearly are not preempted. In fact, I believe that
there is a good argument that policies that instruct police officers not to ask about
immigration status and also not to talk about immigration status that they are
aware of may also be protected; a federal statute that is intended to mandate
subfederal entities to allow voluntary communication could very well run afoul of
the Tenth Amendment depending on how courts view the mandate-prohibition
distinction. The central teaching of the Tenth Amendment cases is that even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the states to require
or prohibit those acts. Congress may not, therefore, directly compel states or
localities to enact or to administer policies or programs adopted by the federal
government. It may not directly shift to the states enforcement and administrative
responsibilities allocated to the federal government by the Constitution. Such a
reallocation would not only diminish the political accountability of both state and
federal officers, but it would also compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty and separation of powers. Thus, Congress may not directly force
states to assume enforcement or administrative responsibilities constitutionally
vested in the federal government. Forcing subfederal entities to allow voluntary
cooperation raises the specter of violating those principles.
Sanctuary policies can, however, be thwarted by the use of overzealous
federal initiatives. For example, 287(g) agreements between ICE and local law
enforcement officials were meant to focus on the identification and removal of

Id. The driver did not have a driver’s license, but did provide a name and date of birth. Id. When
officers performed a background check in the patrol car computer—standard procedure for every
traffic stop—no criminal history was found, but a federal immigration warrant popped up with the
same name and date of birth. Id. Since police could not confirm that the driver was the same person
with the immigration warrant, he was arrested on suspicion of driving without a license and reported
to ICE. Id.
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dangerous criminal aliens. However, we have seen these agreements abused not
simply by the likes of Sheriff Arpaio, but by other local officials as well—more
than half of those deported under 287(g) were for minor offenses,329 and even
some citizens have been mistakenly deported.330 In many 287(g) jurisdictions,
immigrants fear the police and avoid public spaces.331 Likewise, the Secure
Communities initiative that refers fingerprint information to DHS via the FBI for
all participating jurisdictions was also intended to focus on serious criminals. Yet,
the vast majority of individuals removed as a result of Secure Communities
referrals also have been noncriminal or low-level offenders.332 And DHS has taken
the strict position on Secure Communities that it can access all fingerprints
submitted to the FBI by local law enforcement officials even without the
permission of state and local officials.333 Secure Communities “casts too wide a
329. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 8 (citing a Migration Policy Institute report); Nate Rau,
287(g) Deportation Program Snags Few Felons, Memos from Feds Show; Critics Hit Deportation Program, THE
TENNESSEAN (Nashville) (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://mexicanexpulsions.blogspot.com/2010/
10/287g-deportation-program-snags-few.html.
330. Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen born in California, is a developmentally disabled man who
was deported after the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department mistakenly referred him to ICE pursuant to
a 287(g) agreement. Sam Quinones, Disabled Man Found After 89-Day Ordeal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/08/local/me-found8; Joanne Lin, End It: 287(g) is Beyond
Repair and Harms Local Communities Every Day, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/end-it-287g-beyond-repair-and-harms-local-communitiesevery-day. Mark Lyttle, a U.S. citizen was deported even though immigration officials had criminal
record checks that said he was a U.S. citizen. Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported to Mexico,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2009/08/30/917007/
nc-native-wrongly-deported-to.html. They had his Social Security number and the names of his
parents. Id. They had Lyttle’s own sworn statement that he had been born in North Carolina. Id.
CNN researchers have found that every year hundreds of U.S. citizens are deported by mistake. Lisa
DiVirgilio, Report: Hundreds of U.S. Citizens Wrongfully Deported Every Year, THE POST STANDARD
(Syracuse, NY) (July 26, 2010), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/report_hundreds_
of_us_citizens.html.
331. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 8–9 (citing a Migration Policy Institute report).
332. Id. at 8; see MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., THE SECURE COMMUNITIES
PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS, Nov. 2011, available at http://
www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf; Rachel
R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government Participation in U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s ‘Secure Communities’ Program (Seattle J. for Social Justice, 2011), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941826. For example, an abused woman in San Francisco
worked up the courage to call police, but she was arrested as well because the police saw a “red mark”
on the alleged abuser’s check. Lee Romney & Paloma Esquivel, Caught in a Very Wide Net: A Federal
Deportation Program Snares Many Noncriminals and Low-Level Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1.
The charges against her were dropped, but her fingerprints were already forwarded to ICE under the
Secure Communities program, and she faced deportation. Id. This case was an exact replica of one
that occurred in Maryland.
333. Tara Bahrampour, Immigration Authority Terminates Secure Communities Agreements, WASH.
POST (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-authority-terminatessecure-communities-agreements/2011/08/05/gIQAlwx80I_story.html. ICE Director John Morton
announced, “We’re going to continue the program, but we’re going to do it without [written
agreements].” Id. All states have signed agreements with the FBI to send arrestees’ fingerprints to the
FBI for criminal history checks. This is important for local law enforcement who need to know if an
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net and scoops up the fingerprints of everyone not born in the United States
whether or not they pose a criminal risk.”334 Similarly, many local law enforcement
officials who use the National Crime Information Center database, a catalog of
information on arrest warrants and wanted persons, can receive civil immigration
violation information or erroneous immigration information that has led to the
removal of noncriminal aliens.335 Given these outcomes, the challenge that many
sanctuary and other forward-thinking communities have launched against the
misuse of such programs is critical to ensuring that their communities do not
become Gestapo-esque.336
The adoption of sanctuary policies at a time when segments of our nation
are in a frenzy over immigration is an important, bold statement of support for a
nation of immigrants. Choosing sanctuary policies over policies of fear tells
immigrants and the rest of us what type of community our leaders and law
enforcement officials are choosing. The nonsanctuary choice is closed-minded,
resistant to continuing changes that will only breed tension and threaten public
safety. The choice of sanctuary, confidentiality, or “don’t ask” is one of smart
policing—one that embraces change and encourages integration in the hopes of
building a stronger, safer community. That choice also represents an important
step toward avoiding the pitfalls of division, hate, and insular living.

arrestee is wanted by another jurisdiction, for example. However, the confiscation of the fingerprints
from the FBI by ICE is not part of these agreements, and the ICE action raises serious Tenth
Amendment commandeering practices that will likely be subject to constitutional challenge. See supra
notes 169–171 and accompanying text.
334. Michael Hennessey, Secure Communities Destroys Public Trust, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 1, 2011
(Hennessey was the Sheriff of San Francisco until January 2012, when he retired); see also infra note
336.
335. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at viii, 14, 21, 23, 62; Laura Sullivan, Comment,
Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records
in the National Crime Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567 (2009).
336. Many police departments are critical of the problems with the National Crime
Information Center database, arguing that “controls are needed to eliminate the entering of civil
detainers into a system intended for criminal warrants, which creates confusion for local policy, and
may cause them to exceed their authority by arresting a person on a civil detainer.’’ HOFFMASTER ET
AL., supra note 9, at viii, 14, 62. Local jurisdictions that have attempted to opt out of the Secure
Communities initiative include Santa Clara County, California, Artlington County, Virginia, and the
City and County of San Francisco. WASLIN, supra note 332, at 11–12. The governors of Illinois and
Massachusetts have sought to terminate their Secure Communities agreement with ICE, and the
governor of Massachusetts declined to sign an agreement with ICE. Id. However, in August 2011,
ICE took the position that it did not need written agreements with state officials to have access to
fingerprints submitted to the FBI. Id. ICE argues that under 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2), federal agencies
can share information with impunity. Id. In other words, Secure Communities is “mandatory.” Id.
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